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The Congress of Berlin, British Imperialism, and the Emergence of
World War I
by Carl K. Savich
The Balkans are not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.
---Otto von Bismarck, 1876
Lord Salisbury and myself have brought you back peace, but a peace I
hope with honour.
---Benjamin Disraeli, July 16, 1878
Europe today is a powder keg and the leaders are like men smoking in
an arsenal...A single spark will set off an explosion that will
consume us all...I cannot tell you when that explosion will occur, but
I can tell you where...Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans will
set it off.
---Otto von Bismarck
Introduction
Part I: The Congress of Berlin
- The 1875 Serbian Insurgency in Bosnia-Hercegovina
- The 1878 Congress of Berlin
- The Pan-Slav Movement
- British Imperialism and the Eastern Question
- The Evolution and Development of British Imperialism
- The Crimean War, 1853-1856
- Imperialism and Laissez-Faire Capitalism
- Conclusion: British Imperialism during the Victorian Era
Part II: British Imperialism
- Historiographic Analysis: British Imperialism during the "New
Imperialism", 1870-1914
- Analyses of the New Imperialism
- Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Congress of Berlin
- The Second British Empire
- Conclusion
Part III: The Emergence of World War I
- British Imperialism, 1851-1911
- Problems of Identity and Culture in British Imperialism
- Conclusion: Some Damned Foolish thing in the Balkans
Bibliography
The Congress of Berlin was convened on June 13, 1878 to resolve the
crises caused by the Serbian Orthodox insurgency in Hercegovina. The
Congress was meant to resolve the Eastern Question. The Congress,
however, was merely an instance of realpolitik, of power politics. The
Balkan peoples were merely pawns. The Great Powers merely divided and
reapportioned the spoils of war. The Treaty of Berlin that emerged on
July 13, 1878 was an exercise in Great Power imperialism and
colonialism. The decisions were arbitrary and based on the
self-interest of the Great Powers. The interests and rights of the
Balkan peoples and states were sacrificed.
But what was the Great Eastern Crisis about? The Great Eastern Crisis
was precipitated by the insurrection of the Serbian Orthodox kmets in
Hercegovina who faced famine conditions and starvation due to
exorbitant taxation and economic exploitation. The revolt in
Hercegovina spread to the Serbian population of Bosnia. The Serbian
insurgency in Hercegovina led to the Bulgarian uprising against the
Ottoman Turks in April, 1876 resulting in the massacres of
approximately 12,000-15,000 Orthodox Bulgarian civilians by Muslim
basi-bazouks, irregular troops. Serbia, Montenegro, and Russia would
be involved in the conflict, declaring war on the Ottoman Empire.
Bosnia-Hercegovina, however, did not achieve autonomy or independence.
Instead, Ottoman Turkish occupation was replaced by Austro-Hungarian
occupation. The lot of the Serbian Orthodox population of Hercegovina
did not significantly change. Thus, the sources and root causes of the
1875 Serbian insurgency in Hercegovina remained. The sources of the
revolt were a lack of human and civil rights and economic
exploitation. Bosnia-Hercegovina was entrenched in the
imperialism/colonialism of the Great Powers, British, French,
Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Turkish, German. Imperialist/colonial
rivalries and competition between these powers prevented an equitable
solution to the Eastern Question. The Congress of Berlin emerged
within the context of imperialism, within the context of realpolitik
and power politics.
What is imperialism? Imperialism is the extension of sovereignty or
control by one people or state over another. The objective is the
exploitation of the controlled people or state. Imperialism has four
major components: 1) economic; 2) military/strategic; 3)
political/nationalistic; and, 4) humanitarian. The foreign policy
objectives of the Great Powers were guided by imperialism and
colonialism. Imperialism presupposes inequality and domination and
exploitation. Imperialist/colonial powers are not bound to follow the
laws, international laws and conventions. Imperialist powers make the
laws. Might makes right. Subordination and a hierarchical structure of
control and dependence are presupposed in imperialism. All nations are
created equal but some are more equal than others. Analyses and
policies reflect this biased and unequal structure. How one examines
these issues is dependent on the perspective of the observer. The
epistemological issue is always present in historical analysis. Who is
telling the story is always paramount in history. What is said is
dependent on who is saying it. This has always been true.
The salient feature of the Congress of Berlin was the inequitable
relationship between the Great powers and the Balkan nations and
peoples. The Balkan states/nations and peoples were merely pawns or
chattels for the imperialist powers to do with as they wished. They
were merely chess pieces in a larger imperialist chess game. The
imperialist exploitation and domination of the Balkan peoples resulted
in the First World War, the Great War, that led to the collapse of the
Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Romanov, and Ottoman dynasties/empires.
Imperialism, the control, domination, and exploitation of one state or
people over another led to wars and the collapse of the dominant
imperialist states. But is there such a thing as the equality of large
and small states in international law and relations? Is this merely a
chimera and illusion? Have there ever been guidelines for
international morality and justice that apply equally to all nations
and peoples? The principles of power politics, of realpolitik, of a
hierarchy of domination and subordination, have been the basis for the
settlement of international relations at all times. This statement was
true at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, just as it was true at the 1995
Dayton Peace conference and the 1999 agreement ending the Kosovo
conflict during the New World Order era. Has anything really changed
in diplomatic and international relations since the 1878 Congress of
Berlin?
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The Serbian insurrection or insurgency in Bosnia-Hercegovina that
ignited the Bosnian civil war and rebellion began on July 1, 1875
following the massacres of Serbian Orthodox civilians committed by
Muslim forces in the Hercegovina town of Nevesinje. British
archaeologist Arthur Evans was on a visit to Bosnia-Hercegovina when
the civil war erupted. He published his eyewitness accounts of the
Serbian insurgency after traveling to the conflict zones in Nevesinje,
Mostar, and Sarajevo in Through Bosnia and Herzegovina on Foot during
the Insurrection, August and September, 1875 (1877). Evans offered
contemporary, personal, first-hand reports and analyses of the Bosnian
insurgency. He described the start of the civil war under the heading
"Massacre of Sick Rayahs by Native Mahometans begins the War": "[O]n
the 1^st of July the civil war in the Herzegovina was begun, not by
the Christians, but by Mussulman fanatics, who butchered all the
Christians they could find in Nevesinje---a few sick rayahs, who,
unable to support the hardships of mountain-life, had returned to
their homes." The Serbian insurgents in the mountains then launched a
counterattack on the Muslim forces that began the civil war. The
government then sent two battalions of Turkish troops to "aid the
Mahometan assassins". According to Evans, the Muslim massacres were
organized by a local Muslim, a Beg, a landowner and "tithe-farmer",
tax-collector, who assembled a force of local Muslims, broke into the
government weapons storage depot/armory and seized weapons,
"breech-loaders".
The conflict was precipitated by an inequitable tax assessment. In
January, 1875, the assessors rated the harvest at an inflated value
that greatly exceeded its real value. The Serbian kmets refused to pay
this tax. The Serbian Knezes or village elders brought their
complaints before the Kaimakam. What happened was they were threatened
with imprisonment. The Zaptiehs, the local police, were called into
the area. The kmets fled to the mountains, taking their livestock with
them. Many fled to Montenegro. The Vali then established the
Commission to look into the grievances. The Vali gave the Serbian
refugees a safe conduct pass to return to their houses in Nevesinje.
But Turkish troops fired on the refugee convoys and several Serbian
civilians were murdered by Turkish forces. The murder of the elderly
Serbian civilians in Nevesinje by Muslim forces led to the retaliation
by Serbian insurgents in the mountains. This started the civil war.
Evans analyzed the civil war as an agrarian revolt against exorbitant
taxation and economic exploitation rather than a political revolution
to overthrow the Ottoman Empire. Evans wrote that the civil war was
essentially "an agrarian war":
The insurrection in the Herzegovina has been directed more against the
Mahometan landowners and the tax-farmers than against the immediate
representatives of the Sultan. It is mainly an agrarian war.
Evans attacked the "Anglo-Turkish Account of the Origin of the
Insurrection in the Herzegovina" as what we would term propaganda or
spin-doctored news reporting. Evans recounted the official
British-Turkish account which he obtained after a visit "by our
Consul, Mr. Holmes":
From Mr. Holmes we learnt the official Turkish account of the
Herzegovinian Insurrection---or rather the official account as served
up to suit English palates; for, as was discovered by the consular
body on afterwards comparing notes, the wily Governor-General gave a
different version of the story to each of the European Consuls!
"According to our version," recounted Evans," the whole affair was
concocted by about forty agitators". The official British-Turkish
account stated that the civil war was started by foreign instigators,
by Serbs outside of Herzegovina who had come to Herzegovina to start a
war against the Ottoman Empire. These foreign Serbs came from
Montenegro and Dalmatia, according to the British-Turkish official
account. "Professional agitators", Pandours, who were akin to the
Austrian Grenzers, those engaged in border/frontier defense, were the
instigators of the revolt in the Turkish account. The Pandours did not
have to pay taxes in exchange for their duties of defending the border
zone. So according to the Turkish account, there was no ground or
justification for the insurgency. The civil war was started by foreign
Serbs, by professional agitators, forty in number, whose appeal was
directed to the Pandours, who were not even farmers. The
British-Turkish explanation denied the agrarian nature of the revolt,
denied that exorbitant taxation was the cause. Instead, the civil war
was a political rebellion instigated by Serbs outside Herzegovina.
Evans disproved this by noting that the insurgency was spontaneous,
catching the Omladina (the Serbian Revolutionary Society) by surprise.
Evans quoted from a study by M. Yriarte, who visited
Bosnia-Hercegovina to ascertain the causes and the progress of the
civil war, that estimated the total number of insurgents in
Bosnia-Hercegovina at 15,000 men, "of which 2,000 were auxiliaries of
kindred race from beyond the frontier." Of this number, 1,000 were
Montenegrins, the rest were "Sclaves of Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia,
and the Free Principality of Serbia." There were a small number of
Italians, Poles, Russians, and French volunteers among the Bosnian
insurgents. There was, however, a political component to the
insurgency. Slavic committees and societies, literary and political,
had prepared the populations for a possible outbreak. Defense
organizations had been set up, consisting of groups made up of 20-30
members, Evans termed "Cotas", Chetes. They were led by a "Nacenik". A
stronghold of the insurgents was the village of Crni Potoci in the
Grahovo Valley. This area was just outside the house where Gavrilo
Princip was born and lived. Princip's grandfather, Jovan, his father
Petar, and his uncle, Ilija, were all insurgents and part of the
insurgency, led by Ilija Bilbija. Hercegovina was the location of the
kapetanija, the military frontier zone, where Christians were
organized in the matrolazi.
The civil war was precipitated by the grievances of the Serbian
Orthodox kmets of Hercegovina. The Dervish Pasha sent a Commission
made up of the Mutasarif of Mostar and a Christian of Sarajevo,
Constant Effendi, to report on the alleged grievances that had caused
the rebellion. The conclusion of the Commission was that there were no
just or valid grievances. Thus there was no just cause for the
insurrection. The Turkish explanation was that the insurgents/rebels
intimidated the local population into joining the rebellion by burning
their houses and "maize-plot", thus forcing them reluctantly to join.
The Dervish Pasha accused the Serbian Orthodox insurgents/rebels of
committing atrocities against Muslims, which Evans described as
follows:
[T]hey would often shut up whole families of Moslems in their houses,
to which they then set fire. That, (to take a single instance,) at
Ljubinje they spitted two children and roasted them alive before their
parents' eyes.
Evans cited the Consular Commission of the great Powers, published in
the Times of December 15, 1875 as a report of a Foreign Consul, which
showed "very few features in common with this official Turkish
explanation." Evans stated that "the real Facts", the "authentic
history", based on "authentic information" proved "the falsity of
these Turkish statements." Evans disproved the British-Turkish claim
that the Pandours, the Christians hired by the Turks to protect the
border zone, were responsible for causing the civil war by noting that
the insurgency had erupted in the town of Nevesinje, which was not on
the frontier but was "in the heart of the country, only a few miles
from Mostar itself."
The Serbian kmets sent an Appeal listing their demands. The first
demand was that Christian Orthodox women and girls "should no longer
be molested by the Turks." Second, Orthodox Churches should no longer
be desecrated and there should be a free exercise of religion. Third,
they should have equality of rights before the law equal to the
Turks/Muslims. Fourth, that there should be protection from the abuses
of the Zaptiehs. Fifth, the tithe-farmers, tax-collectors, should only
take what they are legally entitled to take and they should do this at
the appropriate time. Sixth, every house should only pay a ducat per
year. Seventh, there should be no forced labor, corvee, but all labor
should be paid for.
The major cause of the civil war in Bosnia-Hercegovina was due to
inequitable taxation. This was how Evans defined the cause: "As in
Bosnia, the main cause of the insurrection was the oppression of the
tithe-farmers." He noted that in Bosnia there are rich and fertile
strips of arable land in the Possavina Valley, "of marvelous
fertility." Hercegovina was mostly "a limestone desert" by contrast,
according to Evans. The chief agricultural products of Hercegociva
were tobacco and grapes, not maize. The government was able to "exhort
a double impost on each" because of the "peculiar character of these
crops." First, there is a tax which is charged for the "tobacco as it
stands on the ground, and for the grapes when carried off as must."
The "tithe-farmer" exacts an eighth. Second, an excise tax, or
giumruk, is assessed by Giumrukers. These Giumrukers can go from house
to house and plantation to plantation accompanied by Zaptiehs, the
Muslim gendarmes, to inspect and assess crops. They abused their
authority and damaged and consumed the crops. The Serbian serf was
under the authority of the Kaimakams and Mutasarifs, representatives
of the "Osmanli ruler" who applied the laws differently to Muslims and
Orthodox Christians. In many cases, Muslims could break the law with
impunity especially if the victim was an Orthodox Christian. He noted
that the Serbian Orthodox population "is at the mercy of a haughty
aristocratic caste, who eye their Christian serfs with the contempt of
a feudal lord for a villain, and the abhorrence of a fanatical Moslem
for a Giaour." Evans noted that in many districts, the Serbian kmets
had to pay a fourth of their crops to the agas who own the land. In
Mostar and the Popovo Valley, as much as half of the crops had to be
paid. The aga had to be given an animal every year as well as butter
and cheese. The kmets had to carry loads of wood for the aga and to
provide other unpaid labor to the aga, corvee. In Hercegovina, the
Metayer system was in force where the kmet had to provide all the
implements used in agriculture. Evans described the status of the
Serbian kmet in Hercegovina as follows:
[T]he Christian `kmet,' or tiller of the soil, is worse off than many
a serf in our darkest ages, and lies as completely at the mercy of the
Mahometan owner of the soil as if he were a slave.....He is thus
allowed to treat his `kmet' as a mere chattel: `he uses a stick and
strikes the "kmet" without pity, in a manner that no one else would
use a beast.'
Evans thus concluded that the origin of the revolt was not due to
Pan-Slavism or because of a grand idée about a "Cosmopolitan
Revolution", but because of economic exploitation and the lack of
civil and human rights. Evans asked, "what at last induced them to
take up arms...it was simply and solely the tyranny of the agents of
the Turkish government and the Mahometan landlords." The insurrection
was essentially agrarian in nature and not political. According to
Evans, "it was largely an affair of tenant-right."
Why was the insurgency in Bosnia-Hercegovina a threat to the Great
Powers? Why did it have international significance? The insurrection
in Hercegovina was part of the Eastern Question, the slow collapse and
political decay of the Ottoman Empire, "the sick man of Europe". The
Balkans became of strategic significance to the Great Powers, who were
imperialist/expansionist/colonial powers: Britain, Russia,
Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey, France. The decline of the Ottoman
Empire and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 made the Balkans of
vital strategic interest to Great Britain and Russia and the other
European powers. In 1875, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was
able to acquire the controlling shares in the Suez Canal with the help
of the Rothschild banking house under Baron Lionel de Rothschild, the
leader of British Jewry. The Balkans possessed untapped natural
resources. They were also seen as a potential market for British
exports/goods. The Balkans, the Straits, and Turkey became important
in British goals to safeguard sea lanes and ports to British
possessions in India and Asia. Serbia and Montenegro emerged as
autonomous states and the other Balkans states were surging as new
powers in the region. There was a power vacuum in the Balkans which
Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and France sought to
fill. The interests of these nations were antagonistic and were
ineluctably bound to conflict and clash. Austria-Hungary bordered on
the Balkan states and saw expansion into the Balkans as a natural
progression. Unsuccessful in maintaining possession of Italian
possessions and losing a major war to Otto von Bismarck's Prussia in
1866, the Habsburgs sought to incorporate the Balkan territories as
part of the Empire. In 1856, Field Marshal Joseph Wenzel Radetsky
offered a Memorandum to Emperor Franz Josef arguing that Bosnia and
Hercegovina should be annexed as they abutted Dalmatia, a province
under Austrian control. According to the British Annual register,
Emperor Franz Josef thought that it was necessary "to accede to an
occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, or even to press further south."
This was based upon "first of all to his alliance with Germany, which
while it lasts makes Austria unassailable; and secondly, to his
reputation as a Habsburg who lost great provinces. He wants to die
without having injured the grand estate of the House. There can be no
objection in the West to his arrangement."
British and Austro-Hungarian commercial exploitation of the Balkans
ensued after the weakening of the Ottoman Empire. Baron Moritz Hirsch
in 1870 sought to build a railway line that would run from Istanbul to
Philippopolis through Macedonia and Serbia and link up to Austria and
Hungary. This venture was supported by Vienna-based banks. This was
part of the Drang nach Osten, the march to the East, policies of
Germany and Austria-Hungary. British exports to the Balkans increased
greatly. So both Britain and Austria-Hungary wanted to exploit the
resources of the Balkans. Bosnia-Hercegovina was rich in gold silver,
lead, coal, and iron and iron ore mines, and had fir, beech, and oak
trees in abundance. Sir Arthur Evans, on November 25, 1878, in the
Manchester Guardian, wrote: "Surely foreign capital will come to your
aid in developing the marvelous resources of the country as soon as
they are generally known. English capital has only been deterred
hitherto from working, for instance, the rich quicksilver mines of
Kresevo by Turkish maladministration."
The gradual implosion and collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the
Balkans created a power vacuum that the other imperialist powers
sought to fill. Russia and Austria-Hungary were the major Great Powers
that sought to fill the power vacuum in the Balkans. The expansion of
Russian influence and control in the Balkans threatened to upset the
imperialist balance of power maintained by Britain. The imperialism
powers led by Britain had divided the globe into spheres of influence.
By seeking to expand into the Balkans, Russian expansion became a
vital security threat to the British Empire. Moreover, Germany had
united in 1870 under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck. Germany
became an industrial and military threat to British dominance, even
challenging British naval supremacy. Germany and Austria-Hungary
focused their foreign policies on southeastern Europe and Asia Minor,
Drang nach Osten. The Balkans thus became a focal point of Great
power/imperialist/colonial rivalries and competition.
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The 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War resulted in the Russian military advance
to the suburbs of Constantinople (Istanbul). To avoid the occupation
of the city by Russian forces, the Ottoman Empire sued for peace. The
treaty negotiations at San Stefano followed. The Treaty of San Stefano
was concluded on March 3, 1878 in San Stefano (Yeilkoy) west of
Istanbul. Under the treaty, the Ottoman Empire recognized the
independence of Serbia and Montenegro and Romania and enlarged the
territories of both Serbia and Montenegro. Bulgaria was recognized as
an autonomous principality and Bulgarian territory was enlarged.
Russia was ceded Armenian regions and Dobruja. A very large indemnity
was also obtained from the Turks. The Ottoman Turks had to make
reforms in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The treaty modified the terms of the
Treaty of Paris of 1856 so an international conference was called
between the great powers.
Disraeli reacted to the Treaty of San Stefano and the creation of a
"Greater Bulgaria" by sending the British Fleet to the Sea of Marmora.
Bulgarian gains meant that Russia would have a greater strategic
presence in the Black Sea and would challenge British naval supremacy
in the Mediterranean. Disraeli thus engaged in saber rattling and
prepared for war with Russia in a replay of the Crimean War. At this
point, Julius Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister,
proposed that a European Congress be convened to comprehensively
settle the Eastern Question. Under the terms of the 1856 Congress of
Paris, any changes in the borders of Ottoman Turkey had to be effected
with the common consent of the signers of the Paris Treaty.
The Congress of Berlin was convened on June 13, 1878 and lasted for
one month, ending on July 13. Otto von Bismarck was the
Chairman/President of the Congress and acted as "the honest broker"
between the Great Powers, here, chiefly a conflict between Britain and
Russia. The Congress met at Bismarck's official residence, the
Radziwill Palace, located in the center of Berlin. The meeting room
was on the first floor with a horseshoe table. The seven delegations
met here. Joseph Maria von Radowitz was the Secretary of the Congress.
The Congress was perceived as the "glittering reprise" of the Congress
of Vienna in 1815 that established the 19^th century Concert of Europe
or European balance of power following the Napoleonic Wars. Bismarck
was seen as playing a similar role to that played by Clemens
Metternich. The Congress followed the Congress of Paris in 1856 that
ended the Crimean War and the failed Constantinople Conference in
1875-76 assembled to address the Great Eastern Crisis that emerged
with the Serbian insurgency in Hercegovina and Bosnia.
The Congress of Berlin was in fact dominated by Benjamin Disraeli and
Otto von Bismarck, Britain and Germany. The British delegation was
headed by Disraeli, Lord Beaconsfield, and Lord Robert Cecil, Lord
Salisbury. The Illustrated London News saw it as a conflict between
"Bizzy and Dizzy", Bismarck and Disraeli. Bismarck was able to agree
with Bismarck because both held similar political views about
realpolitik/power politics and imperialism. Both had a
self-interested, short term, narrow view of diplomacy. Both were
cynical and opportunistic and saw power as the only criterion of
diplomacy/politics. Bismarck maintained that "politics was the art of
the possible." But both detested democracy and popular will and saw
power as the factor that mattered. Bismarck stated: "The great
questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and the
resolutions of majorities...but by iron and blood." War and power were
the only criteria that mattered. Bismarck and Disraeli were agreed on
this. Bismarck said of Disraeli: "Der alte Jude, das ist der Mann"
(The old Jew, that is the man). Prince Chlovis Hohenlohe, a member of
Bismarck's staff, did not share this respect for Disraeli: "I really
dislike him. A foul Jewface."
The Austro-Hungarian delegation was headed by the Habsburg Foreign
Minister Julius Andrassy who was allied with Bismarck. The Russian
delegation consisted of Russian Chancellor Prince Alexander Gorchakov
and Count Peter Shouwaloff. The Turkish delegation was headed by
Karatodori Pasha, a Greek Phanariot. His deputy was Mehemed Ali Pasha,
a German whose real name was Karl Detroit. Ali Pasha was born in
Brandenburg, Prussia, had deserted to Ottoman Turkey, converted to
Islam, changed his name, and had risen in the Turkish military
hierarchy. Ali Pasha had distinguished himself in the Serbian-Turkish
War of 1876. The French delegation was headed by the French Foreign
Minister William H. Waddington. The Greek delegation was led by
Theodoros Delyiannis. A Romanian delegation was also allowed to make a
presentation on July 1.
Serbia was explicitly excluded from the Congress of Berlin. Bismarck
denied Jovan Ristic, the Foreign Minister of Serbia, access to the
Congress. The only reason the Congress existed at all was because of
the Serbian insurrection in Hercegovina and Bosnia in 1875 and the
subsequent Serbian-Turkish War of 1876. The Serbian demands and
interests were the raison d' etre of the Congress. But, ironically,
Serbia and Serbian leaders were excluded from the Congress. Instead,
Persia was allowed to send representatives to make a presentation at
the Congress. Even the Peace Society was allowed to present a petition
if it wanted to. The Montenegrin and Albanian representatives were
similarly denied access to the Congress. This is not surprising
because the peace conference had nothing to do with Serbia and the
other Balkan peoples and states. The conference had nothing to do with
Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Eastern Question. The Congress was
concerned with realpolitik/power politics of the Great Powers, of the
conflicting and competing imperialisms, of British imperialism versus
German imperialism versus Russian imperialism versus Austro-Hungarian
imperialism. The Great Powers were merely allocating the spoils of war
amongst themselves. It had everything to do with imperialism and
nothing to do with achieving peace or an equitable solution to the
Eastern Question that would be fair to all the Balkan peoples and
states, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece,
Bosnia-Hercegovina.
The Congress of Berlin in its 25 articles delineated the new borders
in the Balkans and established spheres of influence for the competing
imperialist powers, Britain, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. Serbia,
Montenegro, and Romania were granted independence. The Greater
Bulgaria of San Stefano was reduced to a principality of Bulgaria and
a province of Eastern Rumelia. Macedonia and Thrace were returned to
Turkey. Serbia gained territory by acquiring the Nis and Pirot
regions. Montenegro obtained Antivari or Bar, an outlet to the
Adriatic Sea, and territory south. In a secret convention of June 4,
Disraeli obtained from Turkey an agreement which allowed the
occupation and administration of Cyprus by British forces, a strategic
island in the Mediterranean, which benefited Britain, an
imperialist/colonial naval power.
The Serbian Orthodox populations of Hercegovina and Bosnia had
precipitated the Great Eastern Crisis by the insurgency of 1875. They
were the reason why the Congress existed at all. But they were totally
ignored and dismissed at the Congress. They had no representatives.
They did not matter. They were excluded. Vaso Vidovic and Colonel
Mileta Despotovic, leaders of the Serbian insurgents/rebels in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, came to Berlin for the Congress. Vidovic submitted
a memorandum to the Congress "asking for the reunion of Bosnia with
the Principality of Serbia or the introduction of an autonomous status
under the sovereignty of the Porte." In a protocol of the petitions
submitted to the Congress, the Vidovic memorandum was recorded under
Number 12: "Mr. Widowitch and several other inhabitants of Bosnia" had
submitted a memorandum. But no one at the Congress cared about Bosnian
demands or desires. The memorandum was not even read at the Congress.
Andrassy maintained that "decisions should in the first instance be
based on geographical and strategical considerations, and only on
ethnographical grounds if no other basis for decision could be found."
In addition to Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Austro-Hungarian Empire
occupied the Sandzak of Novi Pazar, a strategic strip of territory
established by the Ottoman Empire to divide Serbia from Montenegro and
to create a route or corridor from Constantinople (Istanbul) to
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Under Austro-Hungarian occupation, the Sandzak of
Novi Pazar would serve the same strategic purpose: The Sandzak split
up Serbia and Montenegro and created a passage from Bosnia to Asia
Minor. Austria-Hungary obtained the Sandzak at the Congress of Berlin
for a reason. The Sandzak was of paramount strategic significance. As
long as an imperialist/colonial power occupied the Sandzak, access
from Bosnia and the Adriatic Sea to Asia Minor and
Constantinople/Istanbul was assured. Moreover, Serbia would be bottled
up and deprived of access to the Adriatic through Montenegro. The
population of the Sandzak was made up of Slavs who had converted to
Islam and Serbian Orthodox Christians. The Ottoman Empire wanted
Muslims in this strategic region to assure a population that was
dependent on the Ottoman Turks and not hostile. Having non-Muslims in
this area would be a threat because of the potential hostility of the
population.
Both Britain and Germany jointly proposed that Austria-Hungary should
occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina. Bismarck informed the Austrian government
that Germany would militarily support Austria-Hungary: "We should arm
ourselves before the Congress in order to be able to help you with
arms in case of any resistance by Russia. Germany will help
Austria-Hungary not only morally, but also with effective forces." A
confrontation between Germany and Austria-Hungary with Russia over
Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1878 foreshadowed the 1908 and 1914 crises that
lead to World War I.
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During the 19th century, British foreign policy sought to contain
Russia and to secure strategic links to British imperial/colonial
possessions in Asia and the Near East. The result was that Britain
became an ally and partner of Ottoman Turkey. British policy sought to
maintain the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula. This policy was in
the best interests of British imperialism, which was the overriding
concern in foreign relations. India was a major British colony. To
safeguard the routes and sea lanes to India necessitated an alliance
with Turkey. Furthermore, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli,
who became Lord Beaconsfield, purchased from the Khedive of Egypt a
majority of the shares of the Suez Canal Company, which meant that
Britain was able to control the strategic choke point of the then
newly constructed Suez Canal at Suez (As Suways), which opened a
direct sea lane from the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal to
the Gulf of Suez to the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden to the Arabian Sea
in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the Royal Titles Bill made Queen
Victoria the Empress of India at that time. The pre-eminence of India
in British imperialism had repercussions for Serbia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Eastern Europe. Britain thus was committed to
maintaining the status quo in the Balkans because of the increasing
strategic importance of the Mediterranean.
The policy that guided British imperialism in Bosnia was legitimism, a
conservative policy based in Conservatism, or Toryism. Legitimism
dictated that Britain support the Ottoman Empire and oppose the
insurgency in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Liberals under William Gladstone
opposed the anti-Slavic, anti-Orthodox, anti-Russian, anti-Serbian
policy of Disraeli and the Tories. Disraeli maintained a pro-Ottoman
Empire, pro-Turkish, pro-Muslim foreign policy. Such a policy would
safeguard the status quo. Disraeli wrote in October 1, 1875:
Fancy autonomy for Bosnia, with a mixed population: autonomy for
Ireland would be less absurd, for there are more Turks in proportion
to Christians in Bosnia than Ulster v. the three other provinces.
Disraeli based his policy on an erroneous factual assumption. The
population of Bosnia-Hercegovina was a majority Christian population,
Orthodox and Roman Catholic, which in the official 1879 census were
over 61% of the population. The Muslim population of Bosnia was 38.7%,
most of whom were indigenous Slavs who had converted to Islam since
the Ottoman occupation. Arthur Evans cited the official census reports
for 1874 which showed a total population of the Vilajet of Bosnia,
which included Hercegovina, of 1,216, 846, of whom 576,756 were
"Christians of the Greek Church", Serbian Orthodox, 442,050 were
Bosnian "Mussulmans", Muslims, and 185,503 were Roman Catholics,
Croatians, 9,537 Gypsies, and 3,000 Jews. Thus, Disreali's foreign
policy in Bosnia was founded in a glaring and obvious fallacy.
Disraeli opposed autonomy and land reform in Bosnia-Hercegovina
because the precedent it would set would undermine British imperial
control of Ireland and British colonial possessions globally. If
Bosnia were to receive autonomy, why should Ireland be denied the
same? Robert Seton-Watson explained Disraeli's motivations as follows:
Disraeli and Lord Derby opposed anything like full autonomy for
Bosnia-Hercegovina and even the more modest reforms urged by Count
Andrassy upon the Turks---and this not upon the merits of the case,
but simply because they saw an analogy between the details of land
reform in Bosnia and the demands put forward in Ireland and were
afraid to create a precedent.
Disraeli opposed the enlargement of the territories of Serbia and
Montenegro. Disraeli perceived the Balkans crises as a zero-sum
equation pitting the interests of Britain and Russia. Any gain by
Serbia and Montenegro was perceived by Disraeli as a gain for Russia,
as a gain for Pan-Slavism, as a gain for Orthodoxy. Therefore,
Disraeli opposed any changes in the status quo in the Balkans.
Disraeli's policy was simple and straightforward. If Montenegro gained
access to the Adriatic by acquiring territory, Disraeli saw this gain
as one allowing Russia to establish a warm-water port in the Adriatic,
thus threatening British naval dominance of the Mediterranean.
Disraeli explained this policy as follows:
As for Montenegro, it has got about that Russia is intriguing for a
port under the pretence of increasing the territory of Montenegro. No
such thing: we renounce the idea. Montenegro need have no port, only a
little garden to grow cabbages and potatoes.
Disraeli perceived the conflicts in the Balkans not as those of
peoples seeking independence/autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, not as
peoples seeking human and civil rights, not as peoples seeking to
overthrow economic exploitation, but as the agitation of "secret
societies". This policy is based in total and abject ignorance. The
insurgency by the Serbian Orthodox population in Bosnia-Hercegovina
that ignited the Balkan crises in 1875 was based not on the agitation
of secret societies, but as a desperate measure on the part of the
Serbian population to avoid starvation. The Serbian insurgency in
Bosnia that started the crises was motivated by self-preservation, by
a desire to prevent famine and hunger. The root cause of the Serbian
insurgency in Hercegovina was Turkish economic exploitation through
over-taxation. Disraeli myopically saw the work of secret societies in
every development in the Balkan crises.
Prince Milan Obrenovic IV of Serbia and Prince Nicholas of Montenegro
were under extreme domestic pressure to aid the Serbian Orthodox
insurgents in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Serbia was an "autonomous
principality" of the Ottoman Empire in 1875 as was Montenegro. Serbia
and Montenegro ha achieved autonomy following the Russo-Turkish War of
1828-29. Milan Obrenovic became prince in 1868 and the king of Serbia
in 1882, abdicating in 1889. Obrenovic opposed a war with the Ottoman
Empire because Serbia lacked the military resources for such a
conflict. But he faced domestic pressure to intervene. Following his
return to Belgrade from Vienna in 1875, he was met by a large group of
volunteers chanting: "Long live the Serbian King! To battle! At the
Turks! Give us war!" The Omladina (Union of Serbian Youth) advocated
self-determination and supported uprisings in the Balkans. Svetozar
Markovic, who founded socialism in Serbia, advocated the creation of
the zadruga or extended household as a system for society. Jovan
Ristic argued that Serbia should be the Piedmont/Prussia for the other
Balkan Slavs. Vladimir Jovanovic represented the liberals who argued
that an Enlightenment approach should be followed. When Serbia
declared war on the Ottoman Empire on June 30, 1876, Disraeli
dismissed this as a measure of the secret societies:
Serbia declared war upon Turkey. That is to say, the secret societies
of Europe declared war upon Turkey.
This view encapsulates succinctly the imperialist mindset of seeing
people and nations as pawns in a larger game of imperial power plays.
Disraeli perceived everything in the context of British imperialism.
Whatever helped to increase British power, Disraeli supported.
Whatever decreased British power, Disraeli opposed. On many occasions,
his conclusions rested on inaccurate and patently false assumptions.
Moreover, supporting the moribund Ottoman Empire, the "sick man of
Europe", merely to bolster the British strategic position in the short
term would have deleterious long term consequences. But this is the
essence of the policy of realpolitik and power politics in general. A
realpolitik/power politics paradigm is a short-term fix, a short-term
compromise to maintain the status quo. Principles and long-range
solutions are rejected. Realpolitik/power politics are inherently
myopic and short-term accommodations. The goal is never to solve or
resolve a political crisis. The goal is never a solution. The
objective is to impose a short-term fix or ad hoc compromise.
Invariably, realpolitik/power politics lead to further and subsequent
wars. Realpolitik merely sows the seeds for future wars. The Congress
of Berlin in 1878 set in motion the events that would emerge in the
Great War in 1914, World War I, which in turn would lead to World War
II.
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Pan-Slavism emerged as an intellectual movement in the 17th century
that called for the political and cultural unity of all Slavs.
Pan-Slavism, influenced by nationalism and romanticism, reached its
zenith during the 19^th century, at the time of the Russo-Turkish War
of 1877-78. The Hetaira was an early secret society composed of
Orthodox members from Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania, and
supported by Russia which aimed at Slavic and Orthodox unity. The
First Pan-Slav Congress was held in Prague presided over by Frantiek
Palacky. Palacky, however, focused his efforts on Slavs in the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and was anti-Russian. In Russia, Rotislav
Andreyevich Fadeyev and Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky were the major
proponents of Pan-Slavism. Fadeyev argued that Russia should fight to
obtain the independence of the Slavs from the Austro-Hungarian and
Ottoman Empires. In Russia, the Obshchestva Soedinjenih Slovjan
(Society of United Slavs), Kirilo-Metodiyevsko Bratstvo (Brotherhood
of Cyril and Methodius), the Russian Populists, and the Slavophiles
all supported Pan-Slavism. The Pan-Slav and Slavophile Movement was at
its climax in Russia at the time of the 1875 Serbian insurgency in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the 1876 Serbian and Montenegrin war against
Ottoman Turkey, and following the "Bulgarian atrocities", when
approximately 15,000 Bulgarian Orthodox civilians were massacred by
Muslim Turkish forces. Slavophilism and Pan-slavism dominated Russian
literature, music, politics, and cultural life. Pytr Ilyich
Tchaikovsky composed Marche Slave (Slavonic March), Op. 31, based on
Serbian folk melodies, in 1876 for a Slavonic benefit concert during
the war between Serbia and Turkey to aid Russian volunteers fighting
in Serbia. Russian benevolent societies and the Russian Red Cross sent
360,000 roubles to the hundreds of thousands of Serbian Orthodox
refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, who
became the Russian consul in Istanbul in 1864, was the dominant
Pan-Slavist figure in the Russian government. Ignatiev stated that
"sooner or later ...Russia must fight Austria-Hungary for the first
place in the Balkans and for the leadership of Slavdom: only for the
attainment of this task should Russia make sacrifices for the Slavs
under Austrian and Turkish rule and be solicitous for their freedom
and growth in strength." Ignatiev was primarily motivated by a desire
to advance Russian national interests. Humanitarian interests were
secondary.
Before Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire in
1876, Russian General Mikhail Gregorovich Chernayev arrived in May
along with 500 Russian volunteers. The total Serbian force consisted
of 125,000 troops along with 700 Russian officers under the leadership
of Chernayev. These troops lacked discipline, training, and morale.
Moreover, the Tanzimat reforms had enabled the Turks to modernize
their army with German-made Krupp field guns and Martini-Henry and
Snider rifles. Serbian armaments were no match for these weapons. The
Serb forces used the Peabody and Martin rifles which were unreliable.
Russia did not provide weapons for the Serbian forces because there
was ambiguity within the Russian leadership. Czar Alexander II
(1855-1881) and his foreign minister Prince Alexander Mikhailovich
Gorchakov perceived Pan-Slavism as a grass-roots/populist movement
that they could not control. Pan-Slavism offered a parallel foreign
policy that conflicted with the policy of the Russian government. But
like Obrenovic and Nicholas, Alexander and Gorchakov succumbed
reluctantly to intense domestic pressure to act. The Montenegrin
forces were able to move into Hercegovina and engage the Turkish
forces, but the Serb forces were unable to cross into Bosnia. The
Serbian attack with 68,000 troops on the Turkish garrison at Nis
failed. After the Battle of Aleksinac on September 1, the Ottoman
forces under Omer Pasha emerged victorious and had an open path to
Belgrade. Russia then presented an ultimatum threatening intervention
which resulted in an armistice signed on October 31. On March 1, 1877,
Serbia and Turkey signed an armistice restoring the status quo. Russia
declared war on the Ottoman Empire on April 24, 1877, followed in
December by Serbia and Montenegro.
Nationalism and romanticism in the 19^th century were dominant
intellectual trends. German philosopher J.G. Herder defined the
essence of national identity to be a shared language and culture. In
other words, ethnic identity, i.e., "blood", was the defining element.
This is the essence of 19^th century nationalism. The antithesis to
this model defined national identity as merely belonging to a
particular political entity or state, regardless of religion, ethnic
background, or culture. Adam Czartoryski, a former foreign minister to
Russian Czar Alexander I, argued that independent Slavic states should
be created in the Balkans under Russian protection. Serbia "should be
the legitimate banner of all South Slavs, the center around which all
others should gather." He had contact with Ilija Gerasanin, an
influential Serbian statesman, who he advised to rely on Britain to
achieve national unity and independence. Russia and Austria were to
be avoided "because the patron might become easily the master."
Czartoryski was apprehensive of Russian dominance and imperialist
expansion in the Balkans under the cover of Pan-Slavism. He advised
Gerasanin to establish secret societies in the South Slav provinces
under the control of poverenici ("men of trust") who would organize
when the Ottoman Empire collapsed. In 1844, Gerasanin published
Nacertanije which outlined his position on foreign policy. He
envisioned unity only of Serbs, a Pan-Serbian nationalism, that would
unite all the Serbian Orthodox populations of the Balkans into a
single state. His focus was on Bosnia-Hercegovina which he sought to
incorporate into a Pan-Serbian state, a Greater Serbian state.
Moreover, Gerasanin maintained that an alliance was possible with
Russia against the Ottoman Empire and Austria. Croatian Roman Catholic
Bishop Josip Strossmayer was a proponent of South Slav unity and
argued for the creation of a Yugoslav state.
In January, 1877, Russia reached an agreement with Austria-Hungary,
the Budapest Convention, that stipulated that Austria-Hungary would
remain neutral in a war between Russian and Ottoman Turkey but in
exchange would receive the right to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina. Russia
signed a military convention with Romania to obtain access to Romanian
territory to launch an invasion of Turkey. On April 24, 1877, Russia
declared war on Turkey. Russian General Eduard Totleben planned the
siege of Plevna (Pleven) in northern Bulgaria which was besieged by
Russian, Romanian, Serbian, and Montenegrin troops for four months.
The Russian capture of Plevna broke the back of the Turkish army and
allowed the Russian forces along with Bulgarian volunteers to advance
to the suburbs of Constantinople (Istanbul). Fearing the impending
fall of the city to Russian troops, the Ottoman Empire sued for peace.
The Treaty of San Stefano resulted. Due to British pressure and a
British threat of war against Russia, the Congress of Berlin was
convened on June 13, 1878.
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British power and dominance in the mid-19th century was based upon
several factors, one of the key factors being economic power. As David
Thomson noted in England in the Nineteenth Century, "the immense
resources of economic power which Britain discovered during the period
naturally exalted her position and importance in international
affairs." Britain was at the forefront of the Industrial Revolution
which meant that as a nation Britain had the material resources to
become a great power. In 1769, Richard Arkwright constructed a
spinning machine, the water frame, which resulted in large cotton
mills and the emergence of the factory system, an important first step
in the Industrial Revolution. Cotton textile mills were a major
industry in this early period. Massive cotton textile mills were
established requiring a large work-force. The work-force came from the
agrarian sector, former farmers who flocked to the cities to work at
the mills. The invention of the steam engine in 1769 by James Watt was
a further boost. Because Britain had large resources of coal and iron,
these technological advances could be quickly exploited and utilized.
Roads and canals were built. Britain pioneered the railroad system and
the steamship. The geographical terrain of Britain was an advantage
because Britain was a compact island nation allowing the
interconnection of the entire country. Industrialization transformed
traditional society from one based upon agriculture to one based upon
large urban centers and the factories of these massive cities. London
became a massive metropolis, the largest city in the world. Other
British cities as well swelled in population as agricultural laborers
became factory workers. In 1851, London had a population of 2.3
million, which in 1880 rose to 3.8 million. Greater London, the London
metropolitan area, had a population of 4.7 million. By 1901, metro
London had a population of 6.6 million. Industrialization, the
emergence of a factory system with an urban workforce relying on
technological advancements, transformed Britain into a "modern state",
before any of the other global powers.
Industrialization led to progress and prosperity. The Crystal Palace
Exhibition of 1851 symbolized this era of progress and technological
achievement. By 1850, Britain was producing about 40% of all the
manufactured goods, 50% of all the cotton, 60% of all the coal. By
1870, 50% of all the coal and 50% of all merchant ships were produced
in Britain. Britain not only was out-producing most of the nations of
the world, but had a head-start in the this process. The Industrial
Revolution began in about 1750 in Britain, but only in 1830 in France,
1850 in the German states, and after the civil war (circa 1865) in the
United States. It would only be after 1870, in fact, following German
unification and the Reconstruction period in the U.S., that Britain
would be seriously challenged on the economic and industrial output
front. Then British weaknesses would surface and Germany and the U.S.
would gradually overtake Britain. Nevertheless, for most of the 19th
century, up until the later part of the century, Britain would remain
the unchallenged leader in economic progress and industrial output.
The Victorian Age is characterized as the age of progress and
prosperity. Britain achieved spectacular advances in all phases of
economic development. As an island nation, shipbuilding was always a
key industry. But during the Victorian period, the British navy and
merchant ships became unchallenged. Britain ruled the waves,
controlled the seas. For global empire and geopolitical power, this
ingredient was all-important. Control of the seas allowed Britain to
expand her powers globally. To be sure, naval power has been an
essential element of all empires from Roman to Phoenician to Spanish
and French. To become a global empire, a power had to traverse the
seas. During the Victorian era, however, Britain was able to take
advantage of this supreme and unchallenged sea power to gain global
dominance, "the sun never sets on the British Empire". Britain had a
relatively small population and geographical base with a limited
resource base. Technological advancement and control of the seas,
however, allowed Britain to overcome these severe handicaps and to
project her power globally without challenge for most of the Victorian
age.
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A Pax Britannica (British peace) emerged during the 19^th century
wherein Britain dominated the political scene for most of the century
throughout the world. As Lord Henry Palmerston noted, however, much of
this power was based upon image or prestige: "What a power of prestige
Britain possesses abroad." Britain lacked the manpower and territory
to overpower major adversaries. Instead, Britain relied on a "balance
of power" strategy which through alliances and political arrangements
prevented any one power from challenging Britain. British policy in
Europe was based upon the strategy of preventing one power from
dominating the continent. Russian expansion into the Balkans and the
Mediterranean was a key concern of British foreign policy. This
necessitated an alliance with the Ottoman Turkish Empire and Austria.
The Balkans became an important focus of British foreign policy.
Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina now became the
focal points of British policy. To prevent Russia from threatening the
British trade routes in the Near East and the British sea lanes to
India and Asia, in 1854 Britain entered a war against Russia, the
Crimean War, allied with Turkey and France and Sardinia. The Crimean
War exposed the weaknesses of British power, showing that, indeed, in
many ways it was more mythic than real.
The Crimean War originated in a dispute between Russia and France over
control of the Holy places in Jerusalem, then the capital of
Palestine. The conflict began as a religious dispute between Roman
Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy. France was perceived as the protector
of Roman Catholicism while Russia was perceived as the protector of
Greek Orthodoxy. In 1852, France obtained from Turkish Sultan Abd
al-Majid privileges for the Roman Catholic Churches in Palestine. In
1853, Turkey turned down a similar request by Russia to obtain
privileges for the Orthodox Churches. In May, 1853, Czar Nicholas
demanded that the Turks should grant him authority over the Jerusalem
monks and the 10 million Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman
Empire. In July, Russian troops then occupied Moldavia and Wallachia,
the "Danubian provinces", in the Balkans. In October, the Ottoman
Turks declared war on Russia. Britain and France declared war on
Russia in March, 1854, while the Kingdom of Sardinia declared war on
January, 1855. Thus, Britain, France, Ottoman Turkey, and Sardinia
were at war with Russia. Austria-Hungary was neutral but threatened to
declare war on Russia and assist the Ottoman Turks which forced the
Russian forces to withdraw from Moldavia and Wallachia. On August,
1854, Austrian troops occupied Wallachia and Moldavia. In September,
1854, British and French troops landed in Crimea with the objective to
capture the strategic port of Sevastopol. Russian commander Eduard
Ivanovich Totleben created a system of fortifications that allowed the
city to withstand a year-long siege that decimated the British forces.
The British commander Lord Fitzroy Raglan died of disease in 1855
before the end of the war. The British were able to occupy Balaklava
and Inkerman in 1854 and then Malakhov and Redan. The Russian forces
were able to occupy Kars. By September, 1855, Sevastopol was occupied
by British forces. The fall of Sevastopol resulted in peace
negotiations and the Treaty of Paris in 1856. The Crimean War
destroyed relations between Russia and Austria and would set in motion
the rivalry in the Balkans that would lead to World War I.
First of all, the Crimean war showed that Britain lacked an
experienced, battle-tested land army. The British army was
undisciplined, not highly trained, and lacking a military tradition of
competence, such as existed in Prussia and France. Moreover, the
soldiers were recruits and the military commanders were mostly
aristocrats who bought their positions with money rather than
achieving them through merit or achievement. In addition, Britain
could not mobilize a mass army and lacked the overwhelming military
expertise to wage war on all terrains. In short, the war revealed the
British army to be ill-prepared for a major war. During the war, over
26,000 British troops were estimated to have been killed. The result
was inconclusive, and as David Thomson noted, the only major result of
the war was to forestall the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire for
several decades more. The Crimean War revealed Britain to be an
economic and social power, but a rather weak military power. During
this period, the entire British army consisted of 140,000 soldiers, a
fourth to a third of which were stationed in India. Thus, after the
Crimean debacle, Britain avoided major military engagements with the
major powers, relying instead on the strategies of balance of power
and spheres of influence to exert her global geopolitical power and
influence. Maintaining a balance of power in Europe became
all-encompassing. The major threat was from Russian expansion into the
Balkans and the Straits. Thus, the Balkans assumed greater importance
in British foreign policy. The period that resulted was termed the era
of "splendid isolation" wherein Britain avoided major conflicts.
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A real source of British power was free trade and laissez-faire
capitalism. Britain was pre-eminent in "invisible exports", services,
insurance, shipping, banking, financing, and capital. British
financial and economic investment in the US became crucial for US
development. A free trade zone with France was also established. The
Navigation Acts of 1848-49 abolished monopolies which resulted in
increased economic expansion. Growth in real worth rose by 35%. Due to
advances in agricultural technology, fertilizers, crop yields expanded
exponentially, resulting in a "consumer society". City lighting
systems were built, as were sewage systems, paved roads, and gas
lighting. Railroads and steamships emerged on a vast scale. In 1850,
67 million passenger miles were traversed by trains; by, 1870, the
figure rose to 500 million miles. In 1850, 54% of the population lived
in cities; by 1870, 70% lived in cities. >From a social standpoint, or
what in political science is termed modernization or development,
Britain was way ahead of the pack, the other nations of the world.
Britain was the first to modernize, to achieve an industrial,
urbanized society that we have come to know today as the first world
capitalist democracies. This power was real and not mythic. Of course,
these developments had a negative side, the creation of slums, of mass
poverty, the boom and bust cycle, urban alienation, a class of poor
and impoverished. Charles Dickens presented a negative side to this
age of progress and prosperity in Bleak House (1853) and A Christmas
Carol (1843) wherein Dickens addressed the issues of urban alienation
and the poverty and lack of individualism that resulted from
Industrialization. In A Christmas Carol, Dickens attacked a society
that had rejected individualism and the worth of the individual, a
society concerned for the "general good" while sacrificing those unfit
to compete, a world of survival of the fittest where the weak had no
place. Ebenezer Scrooge is a caricature of the British financier of
this age, unconcerned for human consequences, but guided by immutable
economic laws as espoused by David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and Adam
Smith. In Bleak House, Dickens showed how inequality and corruption
were prevalent in this era of progress. Progress created its own
unique problems, such as widespread poverty, alienation, and
displacement. Dickens himself had to work as a child laborer after his
father was thrown into a debtor's prison and so experienced first hand
the dehumanization of the work/poor houses and of poverty. Free trade,
a laissez-faire economy produced winners and losers in a survival of
the fittest. Britain experienced first this byproduct of modernization
and Dickens enshrined it for posterity in the classic A Christmas
Carol, a masterful encapsulation of this dichotomy between
progress/modernization and the human costs it necessarily entails.
A real source of British power has always been overseas colonial
possessions. The major development during the Victorian era was the
notion of a commonwealth or dominion status for the colonies. From a
free trade point of view, this was a crucial development. As we have
seen, Britain lacked the overwhelming military power to impose her
will globally. Through economic power, through free trade and
commerce, Britain could achieve this global dominance by other means,
without a military presence. The evolution of the "white dominions" or
"crown colonies" meant that Britain now had stable trading partners
across the globe who spoke English and had the same core values as the
mother country. But most importantly, the commonwealth arrangement
meant that Britain did not have to militarily control these regions.
Britain only needed to exercise a strategic naval presence. The
balance of power theory and the spheres of influence doctrine would do
the rest. For most of the Victorian period, this formula worked. It
would collapse in the 20th century, however. The establishment of the
crown colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and
the special relationship with the US, where British investment was
all-important, was a real source of power for Britain, a naval power
unchallenged throughout the period. This aspect of British power
cannot be underestimated. This led in large part to what Palmerston
called Britain's "power of prestige abroad" It created a community of
like-minded, English speaking nations and regions with the same core
values. Indeed, much of these lands were settled by Britons.
Australia, much of Canada, parts of South Africa, New Zealand, North
America, were new frontiers for British settlers, who transformed
their new environments based on the British model. From an economic
and strategic point of view, it meant that Britain would always have
trade partners and strategic allies in any political conflict. This
meant that Britain could always count on these former colonies for
commerce or military advantage. During World Wars I and II and the
Cold War Britain was buttressed by these commonwealth nations and
colonies. In the Victorian age, it meant that Britain could project
her power globally and be truly a global power. In India, by contrast,
British power was more mythic than real because in India Britain was
in many ways a traditional colonial occupier of a foreign peoples and
foreign land which lacked core values and a common identity. But
nevertheless Britain was able to project her power in India. The
benefits were mostly commercial. Thus, the crown colonies were a
source of British power during the Victorian era because they allowed
Britain to maintain markets and to project the principles of free
trade and capitalism around the globe.
From a political standpoint, an important source of British power is
the British political system and the principle of Liberalism.
Liberalism, which cut across national lines, advocated a free market,
laissez-faire economy, freedom for the individual, democratic
institutions, and a gradual reform of social and political
institutions. Liberalism, which grew out of the Whig movement,
provided political stability in Britain and the ideal climate for
capitalist growth and expansion. Gradual and evolutionary reform
measures allowed the British polity to evolve and grow while
preventing cataclysms which would endanger the progress already
achieved. To be sure, England had by the beginning of the 19th century
already achieved political institutions which were envied, copied, and
regarded as the epitome of political development. From the Magna Carta
(1215) to the Glorious Revolution, England had achieved what few
nations had achieved, a political system that was stable and moderate.
So, in conjunction with economic modernization, Britain also had
achieved political modernization, that is, institutions of political
governance which were second to none and which were regarded by
political theorists as the most advanced. This political modernity was
a real source of British power. Britain remained politically stable
and allowed a democratic system of governance to gradually evolve and
progress and prosper. This political core of modernity was essential
in keeping British society stable during the massive transformations
of the age of Industrialization and Imperialism. Few nations have been
able to achieve the relative political stability that Victorian
Britain was able to achieve. Liberalism and British political
institutions were a source of real power.
What about the much vaunted British Imperialism of the Victorian Age?
As Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher noted in Africa and the
Victorians (1961), British colonialism in Africa was of a negative
nature and was superficial, "an empty and theoretical expansion".
Robinson and Gallagher noted the following sources of British power
during the Victorian age: 1) British sea power; 2) economic power;
and, 3) lack of foreign competitors.
The so-called scramble for Africa resulted because Britain sought to
defend her free trade interests in Africa from foreign competition,
from France and the emerging Germany, rather than a desire to open up
new markets or to occupy the continent on the model of North Africa.
The scramble for Africa was indeed a "creeping colonialism", a "fit of
absent-mindedness." Free trade and the need to defend it drove British
Imperialism. The missionary, civilizing, and expansionist goals were
mostly ex post facto rationalizations. Rudyard Kipling harangued
Americans and Britons to "take up the White Man's burden" in 1899, to
civilize and bring progress to a backward and inferior people but it
was free trade and laissez-faire commerce which drove the imperialist
agenda. Racism and chauvinism provided the rationale and ideology.
Like the Opium Wars in China, trade and markets were the goals. The
scramble for Africa resulted when Britain occupied Egypt, disturbing
the fragile balance with France. France perceived this British move as
a threat and so France began to establish spheres of influence in
Africa to counter the British presence. This resulted in a rivalry
that was fueled by trade and commerce which initially involved only
Britain and France. Later Germany and the other European powers became
involved in the scramble, such as Belgium, and Portugal. The scramble
for Africa was a negative reaction to competition from France and the
other powers and did not represent a new, positive quest for
territorial conquest and acquisition. British power in Africa was more
mythic than real.
In conclusion, we have seen that British power in the 19th century was
based on economic power primarily, with the emergence of the
industrial Revolution in Britain. The factory system and technological
developments such as the invention of the steam engine and the
development of railroads and steamships allowed Britain to "modernize"
first, before any other nation. This modernization resulted in a
massive urbanization and the development of the modern city and urban
infrastructure of modern nation-states. This resulted in a large
workforce which could exploit the natural resources of the territory
and could produce man-made goods. Progress and prosperity as we
understand those terms today was the end result. Modernization brought
wealth to many and prosperity to many more and generally a betterment
in the human condition and an increase in the standard of living. But
poverty, displacement, slums, pollution, alienation also resulted.
Britain became the dominant industrial nation in the world. Through
laissez-faire capitalism and free trade commerce, Britain became the
most powerful nation in the world. The Crimean War, however, exposed
the severe limitations to this power. Britain lacked the military
strength to impose her will and lacked the population and resource and
land base to overwhelm competing powers. As other nations modernized,
like the US, France, and Germany, British power declined. Throughout
the Victorian period, Britain relied on a system of congresses, the
1856 Congress of Paris following the Crimean War, the 1878 Congress of
Berlin following the Serbian-Turkish War of 1876 and the Russo-Turkish
War of 1877-78, and alliances, and the balance of power and sphere of
influence doctrines to maintain her power, "a power of prestige
abroad". Through massive naval superiority, Britain was able to
dominate the commerce of the globe. British dominions and crown
colonies were a further source of British strength and power overseas.
Moreover, Liberalism and the political traditions of Britain were a
source of tremendous power because they provided political stability,
essential to all business and financial enterprises. By taking
advantage of these strengths, Britain was able to create a global
empire unrivalled in modern times. Some of this power was mythic, the
power of prestige, but much of it was also real.
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Victorian Britain at mid-19th century was at its peak of power. The
Crystal Palace of 1851 was the symbol of this apex of British power
and the triumph of Victorian ideals. The Crystal Palace is significant
because it epitomized the Victorian Age, the age of progress, the
triumph of free trade capitalism, of laissez-faire economics, a
triumph of all the values of the Victorian Age. The Crystal Palace
reflected an essentially materialistic, capitalistic, and survival of
the fittest economic mentality. The benefits of free trade were
emphasized; the human costs of free trade and of progress were
ignored. Progress created wealth but it also created poverty and
slums. Progress created congested, polluted urban centers like London
and Glasgow. Shortages in housing resulted, unemployment resulted.
Along with prosperity came impoverishment and misery. The environment
was devastated, there were no safety standards and many suffered from
work-related diseases such as black lung. Urbanization led to
overcrowding and the emergence of poverty-stricken slums. Food became
cheaper but was increasingly adulterated. Moreover, urbanization
resulted in what Emile Durkheim termed anomie, a lack of purpose,
identity, or ethical values, a rootlessness, a lack of connection.
City dwellers were overcome with an anxiety of alienation, of atomism.
Progress brought a profound ontological change. Before
Industrialization, before the emergence of large, urban centers,
society was well-established and rigidly fixed and determined. One
knew one's place in society and one's goal in life. Almost everyone
lived a life in the village and its surroundings, rarely going outside
this region in an entire lifetime. Industrialization brought mass
transportation and urbanization and mass communication and massive
displacement. One no longer knew one's place. A person became rootless
and alienated from his comfort zone. Exploitation was thereby made
easier and economic exploitation did result. Thus, while the Victorian
age was an age of progress, it produced inequality and imbalances in
society, the poor and the working classes.
By mid-19th century, Britain was on the whole experiencing prosperity
and peace at home and abroad. The Irish Famine of 1845-49, however,
devastated Ireland. The Crimean War was a disastrous war for Britain.
The Congress of Paris in 1856 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 were
perceived as diplomatic triumphs for Britain. This was the period,
however, when national programs and national ideas emerged, when
national figures like Palmerston, Disraeli and Gladstone emerged. This
period saw the emergence of nationalism, liberalism, and socialism.
The values of liberalism were triumphant in this era. Liberalism was
based on the notion of gradual and evolutionary reform and change and
in a free trade, laissez faire approach to economics and a commitment
to democracy and the freedoms of the individual. A liberal society
emerged, relying on the "politics of consensus". During much of the
1850s, agriculture was in a boom time. The British reform movements
proved to be resilient as well.
Britain was regarded as the most bourgeois of all countries, where the
working class strove to become middle class and importantly, where
class movement was possible, where one could better oneself; social
mobility was possible. This period also saw the emergence of the trade
movement, with the creation of the Consumer's Cooperative Movement in
1844. By the 1840s trade unions were on the move. Later, the New Model
Trade Unions would emerge.
The mill owner Robert Owen experimented with Utopian Socialism, and is
regarded as the father of English Socialism. Owen sought to replace
competition with cooperation. At New Lanark, Owen sought to establish
the policy/doctrine that by treating a worker well, the employer would
ultimately benefit as well. Owen's Utopian measures for the most part
failed. He even established a experimental factory in the US, in
Indiana, called new Harmony, which also failed.
The new trade union movement was led primarily by artisans, skilled
workers, the "aristocracy of labor". The average working man and woman
benefited from the reform measures only in a limited degree. But
because class mobility was less rigid in Britain than in other
countries, the relationship was less explosive, more stable than
elsewhere. The working class of Britain, like elsewhere however, was
on the bottom of the social scale. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 1848
eased the plight of the workers somewhat but fundamentally his
position remained the same.
In foreign policy, at mid-century Britain was at the height of her
power. Of all British trade, 60% was non-European, mainly with
British colonies. The British navy was supreme; there were no
challengers to British naval supremacy. This meant that Britain
controlled the trade routes for most of the world and could easily
land troops at strategic points around the globe. The Straits, the
Black Sea, and the Mediterranean became key strategic areas. The
Balkans became more important in British foreign policy. Britain had a
small army, not over 140,000. From 1840-42, Britain fought a series of
wars against China destroying the Chinese navy and creating five
treaty ports, Hong Kong and Shanghai being the most important. Free
trade and the securing of markets drove this fit of British
imperialism. The Opium War began when the Chinese seized and destroyed
20,000 containers of opium that British traders had brought in.
British forces had exacerbated tensions by the refusal to turn over a
British sailor who had killed a Chinese citizen. William Gladstone
characterized the Opium War as follows: "A war more unjust in its
origin, a war more calculated to cover this country with permanent
disgrace, I do not know." The goal of the Opium War was to open
Chinese ports to British trade. Britain followed a balance of power
policy with respect to continental Europe. Britain was at the peak of
its power by mid-century with no competitors to speak of.
On the home front, stability was never in question for the following
reasons: 1) tradition of liberalism; 2) British political
institutions; 3) class mobility; 4) a commitment to evolutionary and
gradual reform. British institutions created a stable polity. As long
as the polity remained committed to gradual reform, and "fabianism",
it would never get to the point of revolution. Was this the "Age of
Equipoise", of balance and stability, of equilibrium? To be sure,
there was no absolute equality and a class structure remained in place
and the British working class had to battle for reform legislation.
But Britain never approached the point of disequilibrium where a
revolution was possible. Why? Because Britain had so many safety nets.
Those disenchanted could first of all, leave Britain, for America,
Canada, Australia, as millions did. This was an important safety
valve. Moreover, British political institutions were amenable to
change and reform, at a gradual pace, at an evolutionary pace, which
precluded the need or justification for violence. The tradition of
Liberalism, with its goals of democratization and the freedom of the
individual, greatly eased any tensions because Liberalism favored a
gradual, evolutionary process of change and social adjustment.
Economic prosperity tended to assuage many of the social ills of
industrialization. Nevertheless, the negative effects of
industrialization and urbanization were real. But Socialism and any
revolutionary movement failed in Britain for the abovementioned
reasons. The British tradition of moderation and gradual, evolutionary
change played no small part. British political institutions were also
important in establishing and maintaining a equipoise in British
society.
At mid-19th century, Britain was at the peak of her power. An
imperfect equipoise did result, a balance did emerge, although
imperfect. Such an equipoise would probably not be possible in any
other country because most countries lacked the political institutions
of Great Britain, which fostered stability, and because Britain had
many safety valves, such as settlement abroad. By mid-century, the
British achievement was spectacular, and while imperfect, no other
country could achieve such a balance at that time.
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Take up the White Man's burden--
Send forth the best ye breed--
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild--
Your new-caught, sullen peoples
Half-devil and half-child.
---Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden" (1899)
We don't want to fight, but, by jingo, if we do, we've got the ships,
we've got the men, we've got the money, too.
---anti-Russian British music-hall song, 1878
They shall not have Constantinople!
---British music-hall song
A key feature of British history has been imperialism, foreign
expansion, colonization, settlement, and control of lands and
territories outside of Great Britain itself. Like many of the Western
European powers, Britain became an imperial power, indeed, one of the
most important imperial powers of the modern period. Historians have
analyzed British imperialism using varying paradigms and
epistemological approaches and methodologies and perspectives. The
period of the "new imperialism" of the late 19th century has been
explained and analyzed using varying perspectives and examining
differing aspects of the phenomenon.
The new imperialism has been explained as a defensive reaction to
protect British national security and free trade and nothing more. The
new imperialism has been seen as an apotheosis of British history and
which would culminate in the creation of a Greater Britain, a single
nation made up of all the English nations. The Age of Imperialism has
been seen as a period of racist nationalism, of the emergence of an
imperialistic ideology based in Social Darwinism. Imperialism was seen
as the "white man's burden", the mission of America and Europe to
"civilize" and "modernize" the globe. Finally, imperialism was seen as
merely an auxiliary of British foreign policy, not an apotheosis, but
merely a continuation of foreign policy by other means, a method by
which an advanced nation interacted with backward or undeveloped
nations. British imperialism during the period of the "new
imperialism" was made up of all these varied aspects. British
imperialism was motivated by free trade but also by ideology and
broader political, social, and military concerns. Needless to say, at
times, it was motivated by moral concerns, such as the time of the
Great Eastern Crisis of the Eastern Question, when the Serbian
Orthodox population of Hercegovina revolted against abuses by Ottoman
landowners and the massacres of unarmed Serbian civilians, when
reports of "Bulgarian atrocities", the massacres of up to 15,000
Bulgarian Orthodox civilians by Ottoman Muslim basi-bazouks, created
an anti-Turkish backlash and a change in foreign policy. Imperialism
is a complex phenomenon which cannot be explained by a catchphrase. We
can analyze various aspects of imperialism to gain a greater
understanding of the whole, but the subject is inexhaustible.
Nevertheless, the picture that emerges from examining differing
aspects does lead to a greater understanding of the subject.
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In 1883, at the height of the "new imperialism", Sir John Robert
Seeley (1834-1895) published a highly influential and popular analysis
of British imperialism entitled The Expansion of Britain, consisting
of lectures which were given at Cambridge during the 1881-1882 school
year and delivered to undergrads. The book sold 80,000 copies in its
first two years and remained in print until 1956. The book was popular
with the "new imperialists" of the period, such as Joseph Chamberlain
and Cecil Rhodes. The Expansion of Britain was published at the height
of the "new imperialism", at the time of the "scramble for Africa",
and seeks to re-evaluate British imperial history. Seeley sought to
define the goals of history and the purpose of the historian. Seeley
sought to find "some meaning" in history, a "conclusion to which it
leads." Seeley shared the Victorian idea of progress, "the idea of
development...movement is progressive, that is toward something
better."
For Seeley, history not only has a meaning and a purpose or end to
which it evolves, but moreover, "history has to do with the State." An
individual is only important in history to the extent that he is
connected to the events of the State. Seeley's analysis relies on
German political theory of the early 19th century to examine British
imperial history. One can detect the influence of G.W.F. Hegel's The
Philosophy of Right (1821) which postulates the theory that the State
represents the highest development of a people and it is through the
State that a people can achieve its positive development. Loosely
translated, Hegel's role of the state is explained as follows: "The
march of God in the world, that is what the State is." Only on page 19
does Seeley acknowledge that he is using a Hegelian paradigm or system
of analysis. Moreover, in addition to writing Ecco Homo, Seeley also
wrote a biography of Karl Stein, one of the most important political
figures in the emerging Prussian state of the early 19th century.
Stein was a reformer who transformed the Prussian state, making the
state the primary vehicle for advancing the interests of a people.
Seeley maintains that Britain acquired her empire in "a fit of absence
of mind": "We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the
world in a fit of absence of mind." He distinguishes the British
Empire from the Roman and Turkish by stating that the British is "on
the main not founded on conquest." Seeley sees the British Empire as a
creation of Greater Britain, that Britain is different from all
previous empires in that Britain has settled its colonies or
possessions with "Englishmen", while earlier empires only conquered,
for the most part, native subjects. Seeley bases this view on the idea
that the British Empire, with some exceptions, such as India, is a
"Nation" and not a "state" ruling colonies. Seeley's notion has
affinities to the German volkisch concept, the idea that the British
colonies are peopled by "Englishmen", of like blood, of like values,
of like religion, etc. Of course, this view minimizes the differences
of "Englishmen", the Anglo-Saxon vs. Gaelic, the Protestant vs. Roman
Catholic, etc. Seeley, however, argues for the creation of a Greater
Britain which would seek to maintain a unity with the "white
dominions", the crown colonies, a unity seen as "one nation", as "one
state", and not as previous historians of British imperialism have
seen it, as one state, Great Britain, ruling colonies and possessions.
The English Empire is not made up of "alien nationalities" for the
most part, according to Seeley, but is "in the main...English
throughout." From here, Seeley argues that Britain should take
advantage of this strength of homogeneity by creating a Greater
Britain, a Britain which would incorporate all the so-called colonies
into one nation, one state. Britain has the three attributes needed to
hold a community together, common nationality, common religion, and
common interest. Therefore, a Greater Britain should be the goal of
British foreign policy and a way to look at British imperialism is as
the creation of a Greater Britain, and not, as previous imperialist
historiography as perceived the issue, as one of a single imperial
state ruling colonies. Seeley thus attacks the traditional empirical
paradigm in British historiography. He also attacks the historical
methodologies of Thomas Macaulay and Thomas Carlyle and the "bombastic
theory of empire", the uncritical, jingoistic theory of empire popular
at the time. To be sure, the Greater Britain concept did not originate
with Seeley, but he most forcefully and cogently enunciated the view
at that time. But Seeley offered a novel approach to imperialism.
Traditional British and continental ideas of imperialism followed a
clear path from Greek through Roman and then through medieval times.
The traditional view of imperialism is expressed by the French
economist A.R.J. Turgot, who stated that "colonies are like fruits
which only cling till they ripen." The analogy is of a grown up son
who leaves the parental household. This was how imperialism was
explained from the Greek city-states to the 19th century. The Greeks
believed that communities became unmanageable when they became too
large, thus, the city-state was the ideal pattern. Seeley, however,
argues that the "modern idea" is that "people of one nation, speaking
one language, ought in general to have one government." He states that
"where Englishmen are there is England..." Seeley looked at the United
States and at Russia and concluded that large states were not only
possible, but that indeed, they were the trend of the future, they
represented political modernity. In opposition to Turgot's analogy of
the ripe fruit falling from the tree, Seeley offers his own analogy,
of an acorn that grows into a massive oak with innumerable branches
and leaves. The philosophy Seeley uses to buttress this view is
derived from Hegel's Philosophy of Right and other German political
thinking, although this influence is nowhere acknowledged in the text,
with the exception of a passing reference on page 119:
Hegel described the history of the world as a gradual development
of human free will. According to him there are some states in
which only one man is free, others in which a few free, others in
which many.... [N]o one would hesitate to put this very large state,
the United States,...as being beyond question the state in which free
will is most active and alive in every individual.
Seeley saw the U.S. and Russia as models for Greater Britain and proof
that large states were possible and that the Greek city-state notion
was not accurate in the modern age. Seeley thought the state could
keep this large nation together, "state" being defined in the German
philosophical tradition, such as by Hegel. This is what Seeley has in
mind. He echoes Hegel when he states that "it is with the rise and
development of states that history deals...the State is capable of
indefinite growth and expansion." The emergence of electricity and
steam power were also seen making large states possible. With modern
technology, large states were possible. But for Seeley, a Greater
Britain was possible only if Britons reconceptualized the issue of
imperialism, only if they saw imperialism from a different
perspective. Britons must see Russia and the U.S. as "vast states of
the new type", federal states, which were all tied together by a
strong State. Seeley states that the "old utopia" of a Greater Britain
is not only possible, but that it is almost necessary to realize.
Britons should see the British Empire as "a vast English nation", and
not as an "Empire", according to Seeley. India he regards as the
exception. India does not meet his criteria of common nationality,
religion, and common interest. India, then, he regards as a
traditional colony.
In his second series of lectures, Seeley analyzes India. "Our
acquisition of India was made blindly," Seeley stated. "Our object was
trade." Seeley sees India as a traditional colony which had value for
Britain mainly as a commercial venture. Seeley recounts how the East
India Company eventually grew to prominence in India and how it came
to virtually rule all of India with the aid of an indigenous army.
Seeley thus excludes India from a Greater Britain. He rejects the
"bombastic and pessimistic schools" regarding the British Empire. He
rejects the uncritical jingoism of the bombastic school which seeks to
maintain the Empire at any cost "as a point of honour or sentiment."
He also rejects the pessimistic school which seeks to totally
dismantle the empire because it is "founded on aggression and
rapacity...a kind of excrescence upon England." He sees India as a
land of many nations, many religions, many cultures. Once a collective
national identity emerges in India, the British would not be popular
there. Seeley correctly warns that the emergence of a united
nationalist consciousness would spell disaster for Britain in India.
That would be the time to leave India. Moreover, Britons should watch
for that time and when it arrives, to start leaving India. This is in
opposition to the bombastic school, which maintained that Britain
should rule India at all costs and that India was essential to Britain
as an imperial power. Seeley thus looked at India with a dispassionate
and critical gaze. Britain was able to "conquer" India by taking
advantage of national disunity, the corrosion of Mogul authority, and
by using native troops in warfare. Seeley rejects the "heroic" view of
British imperialism, that is, that it was through racial superiority
that Britain was able to subdue India. India, in short, was not to be
part of Greater Britain, because, unlike, Canada, New Zealand, and
South Africa, India was not a "white dominion", was not merely a part
of the "English nation" but was a traditional imperial colony of
Britain.
Seeley is important as a historian of the "new imperialism" and of
British imperialism in general because he offers not only a different
perspective or viewpoint of British imperialism, but also a differing
epistemological paradigm. Seeley offers a new way of looking at
history, a new way of examining history, which at the time, was
unique. To be sure his analysis was based on German political
philosophy, but his application to the British Empire, to the "new
imperialism", was important. Seeley saw history, like Hegel, as
teleologically based, that is, as leading to something; history was a
evolutionary process leading to progress, to greater freedom.
Victorianism and Hegelianism converge in Seeley to produce a new
vision, a new outlook for Britain.
Seeley saw history as an evolutionary process from which an observer
could learn. Seeley stated that "history ought surely in some degree,
if it is worth anything, to anticipate the lessons of time." He
rejected history as a series of purposeless and meaningless episodes
leading to nothing. He advocated a critical and objective view of
history based on the social sciences. He rejected history as merely a
novelization of the past. "Break the drowsy spell of narrative; ask
yourself questions; set yourself problems...you will become an
investigator" he stated in his chapter "History and Politics". He
judged historic events on whether they are "pregnant with
consequences", that is, whether they lead to growth and evolution of
the State. Seeley saw British imperialism as a realization of a
Greater Britain. British history was leading to the creation of a
Greater Britain.
In conclusion, Seeley saw the British Empire as "not in the ordinary
sense an Empire at all...we see a natural growth, a mere normal
extension of the English race into other lands." In contradistinction
to other empires, Britain gained possession of these lands without
conquest, but for the most part, merely settled land thinly peopled.
Seeley concluded that "it creates not properly an Empire but only a
very large state." This very large state is Greater Britain, one
people, one nation, ruled by one government, one state. Seeley saw two
issues in British history: 1) the emergence of a Greater Britain; and
2) the role of India in British foreign policy. This is so because
Seeley sees the British imperial role in history s the key event in
British history, unlike most British historians, who regard Britain's
domestic, internal development as the major aspect of British history.
Prior to Seeley, most British historians saw the "colonies" and the
colonial issues as of secondary importance to Britain. Seeley, on the
other hand, elevates the imperial or colonial question to major
prominence.
Seeley's analysis of British imperialism is objective and critical. He
offers a realistic and sober view of British imperialism. He analyzed
what was important and what was not in British foreign policy. The
"white dominions" were important and needed to be united in an
imperial federation, a Greater Britain. India, however, was a
traditional colony useful to Britain commercially but not necessary
politically. If national unity and national consciousness develops in
India, Britain should leave, because then there will be no basis for
British rule there. Seeley can be criticized for such a narrow
delineation. He leaves out other British colonies such as those in
Asia, Hong Kong, Singapore, British policy in China. He leaves out of
the discussion black colonial possessions such as Jamaica, the
Bahamas, Montserrat. Seeley's notion of a "common nationality" or
"common nation" may be criticized. Britain itself could be
deconstructed into Anglo-Saxon and Gaelic subdivisions. Britain was
made up of English, Welsh, Scottish, and Irish "nations", not a single
"nation" as Seeley maintains While to be sure, Seeley intends a more
ideological construction of "nation", such as what we have in mind
when we say someone is an "American", i.e., a more politically-based
notion of Nation, nevertheless, Seeley's categorization is overly
simplistic and superficial. Seeley's idea that Britons settled mostly
uninhabited land can be challenged. Canada was settled by the French
and had a native Indian population before the English colonized it.
Yet Seeley sees Canada as an "English nation" and a part of Greater
Britain. The aborigines and native peoples of Australia, New Zealand
are discounted. The complexity of South Africa is simplified. South
Africa is much too heterogeneous and complex to place as an "English
nation". Seeley says virtually nothing about Africa, and nothing about
Asia, if India is excluded. His lectures were delivered in 1881-82, at
the beginning of the new imperialism and the scramble for Africa so
African colonization was yet to be a major issue in British foreign
policy, although British activity in Africa began much earlier than
the 1880s.The key imperial issue of Seeley's time was India,
especially after India was directly incorporated into the British
Empire in the 1850s. Seeley devoted half his lectures to the issue of
India, excluding an analysis of other areas. Seeley's primary focus is
on the "white dominions" which he sees as being crucial in the
creation of a Greater Britain, which is not only possible, but
necessary.
In the historiography of British imperialism, Seeley offers a radical
departure in the historical analysis by offering a differing
epistemological approach to history and founding his theories on a
different political theory based upon German philosophy, although for
the most part unacknowledged in the text. We also have to be mindful
that Seeley wrote in a time of the rise of nationalism, when Germany
and Italy were unified and when national consciousness was the key
political trend. The 19th century saw a transformation of the
traditional nation-state and Germany redefined the notion of a
"nation" and a "state". Seeley saw British imperialism as, for the
most part, non-ideologically driven, that it happened by accident as
Britain sought to protect her interests against France and other rival
nations. British imperialism was not imperialism in the traditional
sense, argued Seeley, but was achieved in " fit of absence of mind."
This view is arguable and represents an ex post facto characterization
and rationalization. Clearly, there was some ideology in British
expansion and while the motivations differed in different regions,
Britain was motivated by what motivated imperial powers of all ages,
power and expansion. To say that Britain had no plan of empire as
Seeley does is disingenuous. No Great Power can be said to have an
imperial a priori plan of Empire. Empires result from wars and
conquests and are the products of policy rather than as goals or
objectives. It would be more accurate to say the British empire
evolved through a series of twists and turns into its present state
through deliberate and conscious policies and programs rather than to
say that the British Empire resulted from "a fit of absence of mind."
In 1961, an important new analysis of the "new imperialism" was
presented by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny in
Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark
Continent. Robinson and Gallagher argued that British imperialism
could be seen as an effort by Britain to extend and develop free trade
globally, that is, that this is what drove British imperialism. Their
view became known as the "continuity theory' which posited that the
scramble for Africa was merely a continuation of earlier British
policy to extend free trade and could be seen as a "final chapter"
that began with "informal controls" and ended with "formal
annexations". Robinson and Gallagher, in opposition to the prevailing
view, argue that the scramble for Africa is an accidental result or
by-product of traditional British policy as enunciated by Pitt and
Palmerston, that is, that the scramble is merely a continuation of
British imperial policy and not a sudden or new shift in policy.
Robinson and Gallagher see the scramble for Africa as nothing more
than British jockeying to establish a better security in the East and
Mediterranean. For them, no new, sustained or compelling impulses or
reasons existed for a new imperialism in Africa. Neither British
political or commercial motives were at stake. There was little
commerce in Africa. The late-Victorians were reluctant to take any
political role in Africa. In short, the British sought to acquire
Africa for the purpose of "national safety" and not out of a grandiose
scheme to advance colonialism or imperialism in Africa.
To Gallagher and Robinson, India and the Far East were essential for
British strength and protecting "safe communications" between Britain
and India was crucial. The "decisive motive' for the Victorian
scramble for Africa was to protect and safeguard the British "stakes"
in India and the East. Events which endangered security and influence
were causes for alarm. The crisis of the Khedivian regime in Egypt was
seen as the key driving factor for the scramble for Robinson and
Gallagher. Egypt was important because of the Suez Canal and its
strategic location on the Mediterranean and Middle East. The British
were drawn into Africa by "involuntary responses" to events there.
Imperial expansion in South Africa, however, they see as being
"altogether different". In South Africa, British policies were
"specifically imperial".
Robinson and Gallagher see the "Age of Imperialism", the "new
imperialism", as a negative reaction to Britain's weakening power and
geopolitical influence. The so-called scramble for Africa they see as
essentially defensive and strategic in nature, mostly superficial,
reactive, and negative. The scramble for Africa was not motivated by
any "revolutionary urge to empire" but merely sought to safeguard the
gains of the previous generations and as a reaction to the changing
political balance in Europe, with the rise of Germany, and the
French-Russian alliance. The scramble resulted from a growing decline
in liberalism and a rise of nationalism and racist dogma, and the
relative decline of Britain as compared to the U.S., Germany, and
France.
Contrary to Seeley and Robinson and Gallagher, John M. MacKenzie, in
Propaganda and Empire: The manipulation of Public Opinion, 1880-1960
(1984), shows how British imperialism was ideologically through,
through propaganda. MacKenzie examines how domestic developments
created a new "language of patriotism, uniting Social Darwinism,
monarchism, and militarism. The development of patriotism became key
element of the ideological "apparatus of the imperialist state". He
looks at how the working classes were co-opted into the ideology of
empire. V.I. Lenin's view in Imperialism; The Highest Stage of
Capitalism is quoted, that the working class consciousness is divided
into "patriotic imperialism" and "social chauvinism". Imperial
nationalism thus led to the "bourgeoisification of the proletariat"
resulting in their neutralization. Social Darwinism, moreover,
rationalized war as endemic to all countries and a necessary
by-product of competition and struggle for ascendancy. Thus a
militaristic tradition emerged glorifying military leaders and
military campaigns. The monarchy also came to be glorified and
associated with empire. In propaganda and Empire, he examines how the
cinema, theatre, education, juvenile literature, and youth movements
reflected and in turn contributed to maintaining imperialist
propaganda. For Mackenzie, a "popular cultural dimension", an "image
making process" was at work "manufacturing cultural images and racial
stereotypes" which were just as important as the military, political,
and economic control in creating a shared world view and ensuring that
rulers and ruled knew their place. That is, ideology was important in
British imperialism as well. Jingoistic music halls led to jingoistic
movies, jingoistic comic books, documentaries, and annuals. Social
Darwinism and the Victorian views on progress and evolution were
saturating all forms of media and became ingrained elements of British
ideology. This patriotic nationalism was best exemplified by Rudyard
Kipling in "The White Man's Burden" about the American conquest of the
Philippines in which he urged that the white races "take up the white
man's burden", to educate and to civilize the "half child, half wild
races". Clearly, racism and scientific racism as evident in Social
Darwinism was an important ideological underpinning to British
imperialism for it created a hierarchical system which allowed
imperialism to exist and to thrive. This racist doctrine found
expression in all media and was propagated in various forms. Notions
of backwardness, of progress, of superior and inferior races and
peoples, of levels of development and levels of modernization---all
these were ideological underpinnings of British imperialism, and as
MacKenzie shows, they were propagated in the music halls, in the
cinema, in the theatre, in comic books, in children's books, and in
other aspects of cultural indoctrination. British imperialism was
based on an ideology, it was ideologically-driven. To be sure,
ideology was one aspect of imperialism. But to ignore ideology, as
Seeley and Robinson and Gallagher for the most part do, is to present
an incomplete or unfinished picture of imperialism. The new
imperialism was not driven totally by ideology, but it was also not
totally without an ideology. Ideology played a role in the new
imperialism. To ignore that role is to have an incomplete picture and
thus understanding of British imperialism.
In "Post-Anti-Colonial Histories: Representing the Other in Imperial
Britain", Journal of British Studies (1994), Elazar Barkan analyzes
the epistemological issues inherent in histories of imperialism.
Imperialism has been studied from a polarized perspective, either from
the DWEMs (dead white European males) or the alien Others. Analyses of
imperialism thus are biased, unidimensional, and reflect a dichotomy
of "us" versus "them" or the "other". Barkan examines anti-colonial
histories and concludes that "adopting an a priori anticolonialist,
anti-Western perspective is no longer sufficient...a new
differentiation of forms of victimization must take place to explain
the nature of colonialism and its legacy." Barkan points out that
victimization of the Other, the colonial subjects, was never total,
that there was "partial victimization" because many local leaders in
the colonies benefited from imperialism. The racist paradigm is no
longer helpful in analyzing imperialism because racism is now
universally rejected. Moreover, the unidimensional approach of seeing
imperialism as a stereotypically white supremacist practice is
inaccurate because it does not reflect imperialism as a diverse
phenomenon. Many imperialists had empathy and close affinity with the
non-European colonial population. This aspect is ignored in one
dimensional, stereotypical analyses based in an anti-colonial
approach. Barkan criticizes the "post-anti-colonial critique" as being
too tied into a theoretical duality itself. Barkan reveals the
epistemological issues in analyzing imperialism, how analyses tend to
be polarized and based upon dichotomies of us versus them and us
versus the other, center versus the periphery. These epistemological
concerns must be taken into account in an analysis of British
imperialism. Imperialism is a complex, diverse phenomenon which cannot
be accurately examined by a stereotypical and oversimplified view of
the subject.
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British diplomacy during the New Imperialism is crucial in
understanding the evolution of the Eastern Question. In Disraeli,
Gladstone, and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party
Politics (1935), R.W. Seton-Watson analyzed the diplomacy of
imperialism, an aspect usually ignored in the historiography of
imperialism. Using unpublished Russian correspondence from the leading
Russian diplomats of the period and the Disraeli and Salisbury Papers,
he examines the "Eastern Question", Britain's involvement in the
Balkans and Eastern Europe to show the interaction of home and foreign
policy, how British party government was impacted by events in Eastern
Europe and the role of diplomacy in the empire.
The crisis in the Eastern Question was caused by the Serbian
insurgency in Hercegovina in 1875. Seton-Watson begins with a detailed
examination of the Bosnian Insurrection or Revolution of 1875, a
revolt launched by Serbian farmers/peasants/kmets in Hercegovina
against Muslim feudal rule. The revolt quickly involved Serbia,
Montenegro, and then Russia. He then discussed the role of the
"Bulgarian atrocities" in arousing public opinion against the Turks
and the role of William Gladstone, who wrote a pamphlet "The Bulgarian
Horrors and the Question of the East" to emphasize his interventionist
stance against the Ottoman Empire. Influenced by the Serbian
insurgency in Hercegovina in July, 1875, the Bulgarians launched an
insurrection in Stara Zagora led by Khristo Botev against the Ottoman
Empire in September, 1875. Botev was the leader of the Bulgarian
revolutionary committee. Following the April Uprising in 1876,
12,000-15,000 Bulgarian Orthodox Christians were massacred, men,
women, and children, by Muslim irregulars in the Turkish forces,
basi-bazouks who engaged in "an orgy of destruction, pillage, rape and
enslavement." American journalist Januarius A. MacGahan and Eugene
Schuyler, a member of the American legation in Istanbul, toured the
region in Bulgaria and reported on the atrocities. MacGahan wrote
eyewitness news reports for the Liberal newspaper Daily News which
created strong anti-Turkish public sentiment in Britain. Gladstone
attacked Benjamin Disraeli's pro-Ottoman Empire policy, "referring to
Disraeli, he told a friend that the Jews had always been against
Christians." The Ottoman Turks were referred to as the "great
anti-human species of humanity" who had violated "the purity of
matron, of maiden and of child." Gladstone stated: "There is not a
criminal in a European gaol, there is not a cannibal in the South Sea
islands whose indignation would not arise and overboil at that which
had been done." Disraeli continued, however, to pursue a pro-Turkish,
pro-Muslim foreign policy as a bulwark against Russian influence and
expansion. Disraeli perceived the crisis in strictly imperialist
terms. As Robert Blake noted, "Disraeli preferred the Turks to their
Christian subjects." Disraeli himself expressed this in a letter to
his sister:
I find the habits of this calm and luxurious people entirely agree
with my own preconceived opinions of propriety and enjoyment and I
detest the Greeks more than ever.
It should be noted that during the Albanian Revolt of 1830-31,
Disraeli volunteered to join the Turkish Grand Vizier's army to
suppress the Albanian insurgents. Disraeli actually went to the
Balkans, to Yanina and met with the Grand Vizier, Redschid Ali.
Disraeli then glowed with appreciation because of "the delight of
being made so much of by a man who was daily decapitating half the
province." Nothing shows Disraeli's total lack of concern for human
rights and total amorality and cynicism than this quote. Disraeli
opposed self-determination, whether it was Albanians, the Serbian
Orthodox of Bosnia-Hercegovina, or Bulgarians, who sought it. He
despised democracy and human rights. All that mattered was
self-interest and power.
By contrast, Gladstone called on the Russians to drive out the Turks
from Bulgaria. The Conference of Constantinople was analyzed as was
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. He ended with an examination of the
Treaty of Berlin of 1878 which ended the Russo-Turkish War and set in
motion the forces that would lead to World War I in 1914. Seton-Watson
presents a detailed and intricate picture of the diplomatic
maneuvering that was an essential aspect of imperialism and the role
of British party politics in the empire. He emphasizes those other
aspects of empire, alliances, containment policies, spheres of
influence policies. For clearly, as part and parcel of imperialism, an
imperial power must manage rivalries. Control is sometimes achieved by
outright occupation, by economic control, as was the case with India,
or by outright military action, such as the Crimean and Boer Wars. But
imperialistic control also could result from a policy of containment,
as Britain practiced against the Russian Empire. Control could be a
policy of spheres of influence, where Britain would divide a
geographic region with a rival, long a part of British imperialism.
Finally, there was the balance of power politics which Britain engaged
in. This allowed Britain to form political and military alliances to
offset the emergence of a rival power. Britain's alliance and
assistance to Turkey was essential to preserve the Ottoman Empire and
to keep Russia contained and bottled up. During the Crimean War,
Britain formed an alliance with rival France and Turkey against
Russia. As Seton-Watson has shown, diplomacy is an essential aspect of
imperialism.
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In The Second British Empire: Trade, Philanthropy, and Good
Government, 1820-1890, John P. Halstead complains that "our
understanding of modern imperialism has suffered from tunnel vision",
that is, that imperialism has been "made to seem more important to the
Western world that it actually was." He argues that imperialism is not
comparable to the Industrial Revolution or Renaissance and is merely
an auxiliary to the major goals of the imperialist powers. He seeks to
analyze imperialism in a broader context and as a function of foreign
policy. He supports the "continuity theory" of Gallagher and Robinson
in Africa and the Victorians. The importance of local conditions to
imperial expansion is emphasized. He dispenses with the dichotomy of
"informal" versus "formal" empire as used by Gallagher and Robinson
and introduces the notion of "paramountcy", wherein imperialism is
defined in terms of effective control. Halstead sees British
imperialism of the nineteenth century as the by-product, or auxiliary,
of British policy to advance their global interests. Britain's
interests, according to Halstead, were concrete and "fairly rational".
He argues that national security was not a major issue in British
foreign policy in the "seven decades after 1820". So what motivated
British imperialism? Trade, philanthropy, and good government were the
major goals of British foreign policy of the nineteenth century
according to Halstead. Throughout the century, the British government
was concerned with fostering and protecting free trade. In addition,
the abolition of slavery was a key foreign policy goal of British
foreign policy. Evangelicals and humanitarian groups sought to
"civilize" and assist the colonials. Finally, the British government
sought to establish and maintain good government in the colonial
sphere, that good government would lead to stability, freedom, and
growth. He then offers several case studies, in Burma, Malaysia, South
Africa, and West Africa, to demonstrate these aspects of British
foreign policy. Thus, for Halstead, British imperialism is not seen as
an end in itself or as an objective or goal of foreign policy, but
merely as a means or method of foreign policy. We could phrase it:
Imperialism: Foreign policy by other means. Unlike France, which
considered imperialism as the only mark of its great power status,
Britain did not need imperialism. Britain had a large navy and the
"white dominions", it had industry and trade: These were the bases of
British power, not imperialism. Imperialism was just Britain's way or
"method" of interacting with "undeveloped" peoples and states.
Imperialism was the method of a "technologically, organizationally,
and humanistically advanced society---a rationalized society" of
dealing with peoples who were not so. Thus, imperialism is not the
highest stage of capitalism or the apotheosis of British foreign
policy as John Hobson in 1902 and V.I. Lenin in 1916 argued. For
Halstead, British imperialism was benevolent and fostered good
government, philanthropy, and free trade. Imperialism was just foreign
policy by other means.
The beneficial and benevolent and positive aspects of British
imperialism, of Pax Britannica, should not be ignored. Britain was at
the forefront of abolishing slavery, but only when slavery no longer
was economically sound. To be sure, many Britons were motivated by
"philanthropy" and the civilizing missions were sincere attempts to
better the lot of "undeveloped" peoples. But philanthropy was just an
auxiliary of the Pax Britannica. By way of contrast, one aspect of
American global dominance is that "undeveloped" peoples receive our
"philanthropy" in the form of MacDonald's Big Macs, Coca Cola, and
pizza. As for good government, Britain sought to establish models of
its own government, which was not suitable for all countries. For
instance, Britain fostered a democratic form of government, based on
the British model in India, but India remains one of the most backward
and poorest of nations, and is highly unstable. To be sure, some
aspects of a "rationalized society" were helpful, but many were not.
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