The 1866 war strongly affected both Serbian and Croatian politics. Prince Mihailo's government realized that it must make haste with its war preparations and that it must cooperate more closely with the other Balkan nations. The Croats, mainly those from Strossmayer's National Party, realized that dualism was Vienna's official policy and that the federalist idea was doomed. Since they neither could nor would reconcile themselves to the dualist system, they were prepared to come to an agreement with Serbia. Thanks to this attitude, a programme was arranged in March 1867 between the Serbian government and the Croatian National Party which envisaged joint efforts for the liberation of "the Christians groaning under the Turkish yoke" and the creation of a federal Yugoslav state.⁷⁶ The difficulties Serbia had encountered in its political and propaganda work within the Frontier were eliminated, and the rivalry between the Serbs and Croats temporarily came to an end.

Almost at the same time as the agreement was concluded between the Serbian government and the National Party, a plan was drawn up on raising an insurrection in Bosnia. Bosnia's liberation was to represent only the first stage in the liberation of all Southern Slavs.⁷⁷ The National Party's leadership consented to the insurrection plan which was worked out by Oreskovic and given its final version by Garasanin. In May 1867, a steering committee was set up to control the secret committees, and at the head of them all was the Supreme Committee in Belgrade. Serbia again recruited numerous agents throughout Croatia and the Military Border area. As regards collaboration with the Croats in organizing an insurrection in Bosnia, the plan contained the following passage: "Uprisings must be limited only to Serbo-Croatian provinces in Turkey. Whatever is Serbian will naturally tend towards Serbia, and the Croats, being at the moment hostile towards Austria and friendly to Serbia, will help us attract the Croatian populace in Turkey, paving the way in the Triune Kingdom for unification should the conflict of 1848 happen again in Austria, as seems to be inevitable." Pozor, the National Party's newspaper, wrote that "Prince Mihailo is the representative of the Yugoslav idea." Developing his ideas and the plan of insurrection, Oreskovic wrote: "Within the narrow borders of Serbia and with its own resources alone, this idea cannot be realized; in Bosnia all the Yugoslav elements will learn to live together by shedding blood together."⁷⁸

As Russia had always viewed Austro-federalists, as well as the Croatian National Party,⁷⁹ with a suspicious eye, its diplomats, even after the political turnabout made after the 1866 war, still did not trust Strossmayer and his followers. The Russian ambassador in Vienna, Schtakelberg, and the consul general in Belgrade Shishkin believed that Strossmayer did not merit Garasanin's trust. Since they distrusted Oreskovic as well, they wanted "Garasanin to be on his guard against the traps laid by these false brothers." The mentioned Russian diplomats knew that the Croats and Austrian Serbs were unhappy about the Austrian government's dualist policy. However, they doubted that the frontiersmen would en masse come to the aid of their Christian brothers if they were to rise up. Schtakelberg believed that assistance from frontiersmen would be individual, rather than by battalions or companies. He argued that there would be a poor response from the officers because they had a secure living assured in Austria. He wanted Serbia to prepare for war, this being essential, and then, Schtakelberg wrote, "once the Serbs throw down the gauntlet to Mohammedanism, there will be plenty of volunteers from beyond the Danube, without Prince Mihailo compromising himself by keeping company with suspect persons who would bring him no other helpers than those who would have come to Belgrade anyway."⁸⁰

The government of Serbia was prompted to instigate an uprising in Bosnia by the insurrection in Crete, which it believed would be attached to Greece. Russia had agreed in principle to help Serbia, but was waiting for more favourable international circumstances, in anticipation of a new Austro-Prussian war breaking out. As this did not happen, and the uprising in Bosnia was opposed by Austria, France, and Prussia, Serbia postponed the action. In the belief that Prince Mihailo's government would renounce some of its national demands if it delivered to Serbia some garrison towns, Turkey, on advice from the great powers, handed over to Serbia Belgrade and other fortresses in May 1867.

Serbia's success temporarily halted its active policy. As this happened soon after the dualist system had been initiated, at the moment when the Hungarian prime minister, Count Andrássy, was getting ready to crush resistance in Croatia to the Nagodba, Bishop Strossmayer's National Party did not receive in Serbia the support it expected when concluding the mentioned agreement of March 1867. The Nationalists then switched their attention to the Military Frontier. They expected from the latter full solidarity with the population of Civil Croatia, not only politically, but also in "force of arms." They openly threatened the Hungarians and Magyarons that the frontiersmen would drive them out of Croatia as unwanted guests, that there would be a replay of the events of 1848/49.^" Pozor fomented anti-Hungarian feelings in the Krajina, thereby paving the way for an imminent showdown with the Unionists, who enjoyed support from the governments in Vienna and Budapest.⁸²

Austrian intelligence reports suggest that the frontiersmen of Serbian nationality were more enthusiastic and ready to take action for liberation than the Croatian frontiersmen. Secret agents, who monitored everything going on in the Krajina, reported that in the regimental areas of Brod and Gradiska, where the majority of the population were Roman Catholics, there was no need to worry about "an eventual Pan-Slavist movement from beyond the frontier." Except for a few Serbian merchants, in the estimation of the agents, there was "no group in those regimental areas is likely to constitute any danger." On the other hands, the agents warned that in the event of an uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina, a volunteer legion would be formed from the frontiersmen from the areas of Petrovaradin and the German Banat regiments, whose inhabitants were mainly Serbs.⁸³

The former Austrian consul in Belgrade, now commander of the fort at Osijek, Teodor Radosavljevic, informed Austrian Prime Minister Count Friedrich von Beust that the aim of the entire Yugoslav movement was "to weaken Austria and to found a South Slav kingdom," which would encompass the Austrian areas inhabited by the Slavs. Radosavljevic further claimed that Serbia was behind all the Yugoslav propaganda. Interested in the settlement of the Eastern Question and in the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia, according to Radosavljevic, had for the time being focused her propaganda activities solely on "preparing the people, on winning sympathies" for what the Principality had achieved, and then she intended to incite suspicion against the Austrian government and from all this, at the appropriate moment, to gain certain benefits"⁸⁴

Inundated with numerous disturbing reports about Serbian and Yugoslav propaganda in its southern areas, the Austrian government requested information from the newly appointed Commandant of the Croatian Military Frontier, General Ludwig Gablenz, who had replaced Sokcevic. The reports arriving in Vienna suggested that all the inhabitants of the Military Frontier were so much politicized that they could no longer serve as instruments of the Austrian government and Emperor, but had become a dangerous factor to which the competent authorities had not paid sufficient attention. It was pointed out that Belgrade's influence on the Krajina population was considerable, and that the frontiersmen were bent on creating a large Slav empire. The informants also noted that the frontier officers were not of one mind; some belonged to the German and others to the Serbian parties. Zemun was reported to be the centre of all national agitation, and frontiersmen, including their officers, were accused of engaging in smuggling. The agents claimed that Russian money was in circulation all over the Frontier; that Orthodox churches received as gifts from Russia books, icons, and other things. They wrote that the frontiersmen were ready to embark on the struggle to liberate Bosnia, and that the political slogan was "Against the Turks and against all those who stand in our way!" An attack on Turkey, according to intelligence reports, would follow immediately upon the outbreak of war between Prussia and France.

Gablenz denied all those and other reports unfavourable to the Military Frontier. He claimed that they were unfounded or overblown and insisted that there was no cause for concern.⁸⁵ However, that all was not well with the Frontier and that Vienna had good reason to be distrustful of the developments there is evidenced by the fact that in mid-September of 1867, the Military March commanders, generals Schmerling, Mertens, Wagner and Gablenz, met in Zemun to discuss ways of preventing the further spread of Serbian propaganda.⁸⁶ At any rate, if the frontiersmen had been trusted by Vienna and Budapest, they would not have been expelled from the Croatian Sabor, which was instructed to accept the compromise agreement (Nagodba) with Hungary. A decision on principle to this effect was passed on April 1st, 1867, at the sitting of the Ministerial Council, and was confirmed by the Emperor on October 20 of the same year.⁸⁷

Because the frontiersmen were opposed to the dualist system and did not want to be ruled by the Hungarians, they mostly supported the National Party, according to Baron Levin Rauch, the acting Ban.⁸⁸ The party leadership therefore counted on receiving help from the Frontier in its struggle against the Unionists and against the Nagodba with Hungary. In order to relieve Croatia of Hungarian pressure, the Zagreb Committee agreed with the Serbian government in September 1867 to start the ball rolling in Bosnia. The plan was to enter Bosnia only from Croatia and the Military Frontier, to create the impression that the objective of the action was to annex Bosnia to Austria-Hungary. Serbia would take this as a pretext for military intervention. It would claim to be entering the action as a "faithful vassal" to defend Turkey's state interests. Once it entered Bosnia, it would never get out again.

Because Prussia was not in agreement with this plan, Serbia did not dare make a move. When Garasanin was dismissed soon afterwards, there was a halt in Serbia's active policy. After Oreskovic was removed from political affairs, links with the Military Frontier and Croatia were weakened. The assassination of Prince Mihailo in June 1868 was another blow to Serbia and its policy, and also to her contacts and joint actions with the Military Frontier and the Croatian National Party.

Biblioteka | National Plans at the Time of the Demilitarization of the Frontier

Copyright © 1997 by Vasilije Krestic
Copyright © 1997 by BIGZ , Beograd
Copyright © 1998 by Serbian Unity Congress