During the negotiations started in Vienna at the end of December 1871, it was clear to the Hungarians that the National Party was ready for a compromise. This was best seen from the content of the memorandum of 31st December, which the National Party's negotiating team put forward with proposals on the terms of the settlement. This document marked an about-turn in the National Party's policy, because with it, it ceased to be in opposition to dualism and accepted the Nagodba Act of 1868 as a basis for further action. In this connection, the official Narodne novine wrote that the National Party renounced its earlier stance, "especially the hard attitude of negation, which was expressed in the statement of December 20th last year."⁵⁷ At any rate, the Croatian opposition had "all too soon become ready to accept the government, without attempting one single anti-dualist battle."⁵⁸

It was a first but important step of the National Party along a new political road, the road which was to divert it from the opposition struggle to that of political opportunism. It was to lead to a rift between the Serbs and Croats, or, to be more exact, between the Croatian National Party on the one hand and the government of Serbia and the Serbian Freethinkers Party on the other. A large majority of Serbs continued to engage in an unyielding opposition struggle against the Nagodba and dualism, while only a small minority was ready for compromise and reconciliation with the Hungarians and acceptance of the dualist system. With the Croats it was the opposite case. Most of their number were ready to fall in with the dualist system and with the Nagodba, which would be revised, as an accomplished fact, while only a minority was prepared to continue the opposition struggle. Although the rift was already in sight early in 1872, both sides for the time being avoided any discussions that might aggravate matters. Furthermore, the government of Serbia and the Serbs from Hungary and Croatia, who belonged to Miletic's party, continued to staunchly support the Croatian Nationalists and to consistently support Croatia's interests vis-r-vis Hungary. With this stance they forced Vienna and Budapest to settle the Croatian question as soon as possible, which was very much in the National Party's interest and helped it to realize its political aims.

The Serbian government made considerable efforts to prevent the compromise between the National Party and the Hungarians, even after the mentioned about-turn in their policies. After the dissolution of the Croatian Sabor, on January 19, 1872, it used another opportunity through Toncic to influence the leadership of the National Party against the Nagodba.⁵⁹ Toncic claimed that the new talks, conducted this time with Budapest at the beginning of February, were not successful thanks to his diplomatic mission.⁶⁰ The content, course of negotiations and the reason for their failure were reported to the Serbian government through Toncic by one of the party leaders Matija Mrazovic. At the same time, Consul Kállay wrote to his superiors that the Serbian government would rejoice to see disturbances break out in Croatia which it would be all too happy to stir up.⁶² It is interesting that the Serbs from Hungary, rallied around Miletic, a few months later and soon after the May elections of 1872, did anticipate that disturbances might occur in Croatia. They were ready to join those disturbances and to draw Serbia into them as well.⁶³ The Serbian government did not content itself merely with attacking the Hungarian policy toward Croatia in newspaper articles, but also, as Kállay wrote in February, interfered in other ways in the internal affairs of the Monarchy. Among other things, it promised financial aid to certain trusted members of the National Party in the event of new elections. Kállay felt that a sincere reconciliation between Croatia and Hungary would level a heavy blow against the Serbian government, which would then seek all possible ways of preventing such an agreement. By then, on February 15, 1872, the Consul had realized that the Regency had not been successful in all its anti-Nagodba intentions, that the moderate stance of the Croatian opposition press was causing it concern, and that, in the event of the Nagodba coming to fruition, it would explore possibilities of a new anti-dualist opposition being formed in Croatia, and was pursuing this goal with all the means at its disposal.⁶⁴ In mid-February, confidential talks were held between the Serbian government and some Croatian politicians about ways in which Serbia could help the National Party in the upcoming elections for the Sabor. They drafted an anti-Nagodba programme under which the government of Serbia agreed to support the National Party financially.⁶⁵ Soon afterwards, the editor of Obzor, Mile Maravic, visited Belgrade, where he expected to get help for his paper, which reflected the views of the National Party.⁶⁶ Informing the commandant of the Military Frontier, Vice-Marshal Mollinary, about the political situation among the Serbs in Hungary and their links with the National Party in Croatia and with the Czechs, the commander of the Zemun Brigade wrote early in 1872 that "nothing is taking place without the knowledge and support of the Regency. Informed circles in Novi Sad comment that the Serbian government is quite generous with financial resources to help agitation."⁶⁷

Familiar with the Croatian and Serbian national movements and their mutual relations, the Hungarian government discussed this question at its meeting of February 3, 1872, focusing mainly on the settlement of the conflict between Croatia and Hungary. Judging by the course of the meeting, Lónyay did not attribute much significance to the Croato-Serbian links. However, these were dealt with at length by Kerkápoly, the minister of finances. He believed that accusations against Croats for their enthusiasm over the Yugoslav state might not be unfounded, but that their momentary hostility toward the Hungarians did not stem from there. On the basis of his knowledge of the conditions in Croatia, Kerkápoly declared that the National Party was prepared to recognize the unity of the Hungarian crownland and the union between Croatia and Hungary, and that it did not want to secede but only to strengthen its independence. If they realized that their country's independence was threatened, the Croats would defend it against all attacks, including those which might come from the Hungarian government. Kerkápoly expressed the hope that relations between Croatia and Hungary would clear up, and that the Croats would understand that they have more reason to distrust the Serbs than the Hungarians, because they were their rivals in the struggle for the leading role among the Southern Slavs. This was the probable reason, the Hungarian politician said, why Serbia was viewing the Nagodba "with malicious eyes," because then Croatia would become reconciled with Hungary, and there would be an end to the Croats' dissatisfaction. In this case, Croatia would take over the initiative in the South Slav movement from Serbia, without thereby weakening the inner strength of the Monarchy. The minister of education Teodor Pauler was equally distrustful of both the Serbs and Croats, but recommended a cautious rapprochement with the Croats, lest they misread the Hungarian government's concessions. A similar attitude was taken by some other members of the Hungarian government, such as Bittó, Tisza, and Szlavy, who realized that the Croatian National Party wanted an agreement with the Hungarians, but also that the Southern Slavs were bent on weakening Hungary. Tóth, Bedekovic and Pejacevic alone were resolutely against the government in Croatia being delivered up to the Nationalists.⁶⁸

Hungarian Prime Minister Lónyay, who in February 1872, paid little attention to the Serb-Croat political union, thoroughly changed his views during the May elections in that year. He was particularly disturbed by Serbia, whose official newspaper, Jedinstvo, openly sided with the Croatian National Party. Requesting assistance from Andrássy, the joint minister of foreign affairs, Lónyay particularly attacked the newspaper Jedinstvo. He wrote that the articles in the Serbian government's official organ were designed to bring disquiet among the Slav population under the Monarchy, which was being fed with information by political agitators to the effect that in the pursuit of their national and political agendas, which according to Lónyay were chimerical, they could count on assistance from foreign powers, including Serbia. The Prime Minister told Andrássy that Jedinstvo fully supported the views and aspirations of the Croatian National Party and the policies of the Serbian extremists from southern Hungary. This attitude, which he always did regard as dangerous, appeared to be even more so at the moment, when the electoral campaign was in full swing in both Croatia and Hungary for the Zagreb and Budapest parliaments, "when national factions in the areas of southern Hungary, which are inhabited by South Slav tribes, are putting a tremendous amount of energy into efforts to realize those aspirations which are dangerous for the state." Lónyay therefore requested Andrássy to intercede with the government of Serbia its official newspaper should not overstep the boundaries existing between the two neighbouring and friendly countries.⁶⁹ Andrássy did not think it was opportune to undertake diplomatic steps on account of Jedinstvo's "anti-Hungarian provocative articles"; he preferred to ban the newspaper's distribution in Austria-Hungary. The Hungarian government approved this proposal, and from June 1872 onwards, Jedinstvo could no longer be distributed by mail anywhere in the lands of the Hungarian crown.⁷⁰

The facts presented so far do not suggest that the memorandums made use of in the electoral campaign in 1872 by Vice-Ban Antun Vakanovic, were entirely invented, at least as far as Serbia was concerned. The agreement and cooperation between the leadership of the National Party and the Serbian government are beyond dispute. So, too, is the evidence that the National Party received from Belgrade not only moral but also financial support from Belgrade. Whether it amounted to 27,500 forints, as one of the memorandums stated, is not even relevant.⁷¹

The Serbian government's collaboration with the National Party lasted until the latter, after the May elections of 1872, in which it won, complied with Lónyay's demand to join up with moderate Unionists, to approve almost all the Unionist mandates in the Sabor, to secure for the Unionists one half of the places in the regnal deputation for negotiations on the revision of the Nagodba, and one half of the total number of Croatian deputies in the common parliament in Budapest. After Milan Makanac, disagreeing with these concessions, denounced the National Party and left its parliamentary group, it became clear to the government of Serbia that any further cooperation with the National Party against the Nagodba revision had become pointless. It actually did continue for a while to oppose the revision, in collaboration not with the opportunist majority led by Mrazovic but with the Nationalist minority led by Makanac.⁷² The anti-Nagodba articles in Jedinstvo were emulated by the newspaper Istok, which was also under the patronage of Jovan Ristic.⁷³ But these only the last faltering attempts to carry on the common struggle of the Serbs and Croats against the Hungarians and the Nagodba revision, a struggle which had been defeated by the National Party's opportunist policy. Ready for reconciliation with the Hungarians, the party leadership came to the conclusion that the demands of the Croats were greater than the actual possibilities of Croatia, which did not have either material resources or the men for a further struggle, and that it must be content with a minimal fulfilment of its programme.⁷⁴ By taking this attitude, the National Party abandoned its political alliance with Serbia, and as a result the Serbian government was drawn into open conflict with its northern neighbour.

Soon after the National Party's renunciation of further struggle for the fulfilment of its maximalist programme, Serbia, too, was forced to become reconciled with Austria-Hungary. It was compelled to do so by international circumstances, particularly the fact that the Berlin meeting of the three emperors (William I, Alexander II, and Francis Joseph), held in September 1872, ironed out the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Thereafter Russia advised the Balkan countries to improve their relations with Austria-Hungary. Pressed by economic reasons to make peace with the Monarchy, Serbia could not, even if it had wanted to, continue an open struggle against its more powerful neighbour.

Both the Serbian Regents and the Croatian National Party joined a common struggle against the revision of the Nagodba, for their own national and political interests which, equally threatened by Vienna and Budapest, could have been coordinated. However, this common struggle brought Serbia no benefit, while it did help the National Party to win power. The consequences of the revision on the further relations between Serbia and Croatia were catastrophic, exactly as foreseen by Consul Kállay. According to his evaluation, made on July 12th, 1873, the revision dealt "a death blow to Serbian aspirations" and therefore was not favourably received in Belgrade government circles.⁷⁶ Foreign Minister Ristic approved it only insofar as it was better than the previous "unsettled and sad situation in Croatia in which the Magyarons laid down the law." He expected the Nationalists, on the basis of the revised Nagodba, to try to achieve "a full and genuine autonomy and historical rights for its oppressed country, and, most important of all, to work to form a new Croatian government from educated and proven Serbian and Croatian patriots." During September 1873, Ristic's envoy, Nicifor Ducic, held talks with Mrazovic and Racki about the unification of all the Serbian peoples with Serbia, "whereas the Slovenes could align themselves with the Croats, so that in the Slav South there should be only two federal states, Serbian and Croatian. In due course, as education and political consciousness take root among the people, they should merge into one."⁷⁷ But soon after the revision of the Nagodba, the appeased Croatia, led by a Nationalist government, became Serbia's serious rival in the rallying of Southern Slavs and in the desire to annex Bosnia and Hercegovina, an area which had become an apple of discord between the two countries. This was particularly obvious during the Eastern crisis of 1875-1878. Thus the revision acted as a powerful disintegrating factor between Serbia and Croatia. Austria-Hungary had sown the seeds of discord which were to keep the two peoples at loggerheads over several decades and help it achieve its political and state plans at their expense.

Biblioteka | Revision of the Nagodba - Serbs and Croats Part Ways

Copyright © 1997 by Vasilije Krestic
Copyright © 1997 by BIGZ , Beograd
Copyright © 1998 by Serbian Unity Congress