Soon after the downfall of absolutism, different conceptions of the lines national development should take were elaborated in Croatia, but their protagonists did not succeed in winning over for them the Serbs from the Triune state, since they were mostly concerned with the Croatian state and Croatian national interests. The Serbs found that the conceptions of the Serbian politicians were closer to their needs, aspirations, and objectives. Dissensions between the Serbian and Croatian political leaderships, generated by Vienna's perfidious policy on Srem, now extended to a whole series of other highly important questions concerning the national development of Serbs in Croatia. Disagreements arose most of all over differing attitudes toward the method of dealing with the Eastern Question and who should play the leading role in it. Closely linked to it was the ultimate fate of Bosnia and Hercegovina, which was claimed by both sides. At that time, the most interested in the Eastern Question in Croatia was the strongest political party, the National Party, headed by Bishop Strossmayer. This party with its eminent leader wanted the Croats and Croatia with the armed Military Frontier to become the decisive political and military factor in the settlement of the Eastern Question. They believed that they could achieve it in a federalist monarchy, in which Croatia would ensure its territorial integrity and receive broad internal autonomy. Strossmayer and the men around him believed that a territorially unified Croatia as a separate federal unit would be very attractive to all the Southern Slavs in Austria, and that Zagreb rather than Belgrade would then become the leading centre of the South Slav liberation effort. Since Bosnia and Hercegovina would after liberation come under Austria as parts of the Croatian lands, Strossmayer asked for and expected assistance and support from the government in Vienna, convinced that such a method of settling the Eastern Question would suit not only the Croats but also the general state and dynastic interests of the Habsburgs.

The Serbs in Hungary, irrespective of their sociopolitical and party affiliations, believed that the Serbs rather than Croats, Belgrade rather than Zagreb, should have the leading role in dealing with the Eastern Question. The question of Bosnia and Hercegovina, both then and later, they regarded as an exclusively Serbian issue, in the belief that the best and only solution was for these areas to be attached to Serbia after their liberation. Because of such mutually contradictory stances, the political leaderships of the Serbs and Croats were not able to find a common base for their national movements, although the Serbian government in Belgrade made some attempts in this direction in the early 1860s.

In such a situation, the Serbs from Croatia had no other choice but to opt for the policy which was closer to them and which opened up better prospects for their independent national development. For these reasons, they were in favour of the policies and ideas emanating from Novi Sad and Belgrade. Holding to these conceptions, the Serbs from Croatia fell in with one or the other of two political parties: the Unionist Party, which sought cooperation and union with Hungary, i.e., which favoured a dualist reconstitution of the Monarchy, and the pro-government Independent National Party, which formally approved of centralism. The most distinguished representatives of these two parties among the Serbs in Croatia were Maksimilijan Prica, Ognjeslav Utjesenovic Ostrozinski, Nikola Krestic, Svetozar Kusevic, Livije Radivojevic, Nikola Begovic, Jovan Zivkovic, Zivojin Kirjakovic, and Ilija Gutesa. This party alignment was similar to that among the Serbs in Hungary, where Srbski dnevnik and Zastava championed the interests of the former, and Srbobran and Napredak those of the latter. It came as a result of the desire for the closest possible cooperation among all the Serbs in the Monarchy. Some wanted these links to be realized within the framework of Hungary, and others within the framework of a unified Austria. When the National Party deputies in the Croatian Sabor in 1861 claimed that the events of 1848 legally put an end to all legislative, administrative or any other links between the Triune Kingdom and the Kingdom of Hungary and that they were only linked by a common ruler, both the Serbs from Croatia and those from Hungary were resolutely against it. Following the dissolution of the legal links between Croatia and Hungary, they would be split because one part of them would live under Croatian and the other under Hungarian administration, a prospect which they did not relish in the least. In this connection, Srbski dnevnik wrote that the South Slav independent policy from Zagreb was helping to strengthen Hungary's supremacy, and the Serbs therefore could not approve of this policy. "The Serbs from Vojvodina and Croatia want unity," wrote the newspaper, which could not be achieved by a personal union between Croatia and Hungary as sought by the National Party. The newspaper went on to say: "We hope that the Serbs in the Zagreb Sabor will understand what the correct policy is. Those who have spoken so far have not disappointed us."²⁰

In the matter of the reconstitution of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Serbs as a whole, irrespective of their party affiliation, did not favour the kind of federalism built upon the principles of historical countries, as advocated by Strossmayer and his National Party. The Serbs in Croatia and Hungary did not have the same historical and state rights as the Croats, Czechs, and Hungarians. It was obvious to them that in a federalist monarchy such as the Croats and Czechs wanted to build, inside the Triune state and Hungary they would not be granted even the elementary conditions for their separate national development. Opposing federalism based on the principle of state and historical rights, the Serbs under the wing of the Croatian Independent National Party did want federalism, but on a national basis, on the principle of natural rights. These Serbs, therefore, accepted the October Diploma and February Patent in the hope that on some points they might correct them, alter them, and adjust them to their own ideas about a federalist reconstitution of the Monarchy. This was another reason why there were no Serbs from Croatia in the ranks of Strossmayer's National Party. On the contrary, for as long as the question of Austria's reconstitution was topical, there were reasons enough for dissension and even open conflicts between the Serbian and Croatian national movements.²²

Many Serbs, especially those who preferred a conservative-clericalist option, led by the church hierarchy and affiliated with the Independent National Party, could not establish closer links with the National Party because they disapproved of the method of the Monarchy's reconstitution on the one hand, and for purely religious reasons on the other. Aware of certain attempts to proselytize the Serbs and Bulgarians, they suspected that the leadership of the National Party, headed by Strossmayer and Racki, had given themselves the task, "under the guise of brotherly and South Slav cooperation," to Catholicize the Serbs and Bulgars.²³ Themselves imbued with strong religious feelings which were not far from religious bigotry, the conservative-clericalist politicians came into open conflict with the people from the National Party, considering that they, striving for union of non-Catholics with the Catholic Church, most directly threatened the positions and interests of the Serbian Church and Orthodox faith.²⁴

Although Strossmayer's National Party did more than others for the cultural and political unification of the South Slavs, there were no Serbs from Croatia in its ranks until mid-1866. Although giving it credit for promoting the Croatian national spirit, politics and culture, Serbian leaders believed that this party was responsible for the misguided policies in general and in particular the national policy vis-r-vis the Serbs.²⁵ In their opinion, the National Party, having a different view of how the Eastern Question should be settled from the Serbs, endeavoured to realize the greater Croatian idea, to expunge the Serbian name in Croatia and to eventually to Croatize the Serbs.²⁶ Namely, the Croatian Sabor of 1861 admitted that "there are also Serbian people in the Triune Kingdom." The Sabor further declared that it always wanted "the Serbs and Croats as the closest brothers of the same race to love and respect one another as something sacred and remain in future as heretofore in fraternal accord."²⁷ Serbian politicians less than happy about this statement, because the physical presence of the Serbs on the soil of the Triune Kingdom was something that could not be denied.²⁸ Although they were satisfied with the decision allowing free use of the Cyrillic script, they were not pleased with the Sabor's decision that the official language of the Triune Kingdom should be called "Yugoslav."²⁹ They were in favour of accepting Ivan Kukuljevic's proposal to name the language "Croato-Serbian" or "Croatian or Serbian."³⁰ While the Croatian Sabor of 1861 was still in session, they publicly expressed the hope that the Croat politicians would meet Serbian demands and in addition to their name would also acknowledge their "general national interests." In other words, they had already put forward the demand for the Croatian Sabor to recognize the Serbs their national individuality; they wanted to be made equal with Croats in rights and duties throughout the Triune Kingdom in political, legislative, administrative, judicial and all other respects. They demanded that the Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet should be in official use in the existing counties, as well as in those which were to be set up later and which would have a Serbian majority. They thought that this same right should be given to each district of any county, wherever the Serbs were in the majority. They further asked that the Serbs should be proportionately represented in all the organs of government,³² that they receive assistance for national institutions in the same proportion as the Croats, and that the state authorities should exercise oversight over the Serbian church and school affairs only through the intermediary of Serbs. This, according to Zastava, was the basic desire and demand of the Serbian people in the Triune Kingdom whose fulfilment would decide whether the Serbs would "wholeheartedly regard that country as their homeland and defend its constitution and independence against any assault."³³

Generally speaking, the Serbian demands were not well seen in Croatia. In the ranks of the National Party, it was held that they were exaggerated, that the Serbs had hegemonist ambitions,³⁴ that they were dangerous for the Croats and Catholicism and should be curbed.³⁵ But there were some in Croatia who did not fear the Serbs and thought that the Croats were unduly apprehensive about being Serbianized, that in their shortsightedness they did not see that the danger lurked not from the Serbs but from Vienna,³⁶ and instead of working towards rapprochement and unification, they spread discord and caused animosity.³⁷

The worst forms of discord and strife could be seen, as at the time of absolutism, in the Military Frontier. Here again, Gospic, the seat of the 1st Lika Regiment, was the centre of Croat-Serb and Catholic-Orthodox dissensions. As a matter of fact, there was no friction among the broader strata of the population, either Serbian or Croatian. The followers of both confessions lived in absolute harmony, took wives or husbands from the other community, and made donations to each other's churches. Their relations were upset by the behaviour of the Catholic priests, who were incited against the Orthodox Church by the military authorities. They seemed to have been bent on spreading religious hatred and proving that the Serbs, by being Orthodox, were second-class citizens. As in the time of absolutism, once again the main provocations happened on Orthodox and Catholic Good Friday. On Catholic Good Friday, soldiers with drawn bayonets stood guard around the Orthodox Church, where the bells were tied up, so that they might not ring. On orders from the regiment commandant, on Orthodox Good Friday, concerts and dancing parties were held in the main street of Gospic. Complaining to Ban Sokcevic about such provocations, an Orthodox priest from Gospic said that "nobody will harvest much fruit of mutual love and concord," but will sow dissension, for it is obvious that the mentioned colonel "has much hatred for our religion." "Under these circumstances, I can no longer guarantee that from now on, notwithstanding any orders and prohibitions, bells in the Orthodox Church will not ring on the Catholic Good Friday," said the Gospic priest, and expressed hope that the Serbs in the Military Frontier "will be treated like all other Austrian citizens."

Biblioteka | The "Political" People of Croatia

Copyright © 1997 by Vasilije Krestic
Copyright © 1997 by BIGZ , Beograd
Copyright © 1998 by Serbian Unity Congress