The consistent refusal by the followers of the National Party to recognize the Serbs in Croatia was partly due to the uncoordinated and competing stances of the Serbian and Croatian political leaderships on how the Eastern Question should be handled. When after the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 all the hopes of the National Party to reconstitute Austria on the basis of federalism were dashed, and it had become clear that the system of dualism had prevailed, the National Party's ideas on solving the Eastern Question under Croatia's leadership had to be rejected as unfeasible. Only then did cooperation and agreement appear possible between Belgrade and Zagreb, because the Croatian Nationalists had at last understood that Serbia rather than Austria should lead the South-Slav action to settle the Eastern Question, that independent Belgrade rather than Zagreb, which was subservient to the central authority in Vienna, should be the centre of the liberation and unification movement. Encouraged by the Serbian government headed by Ilija Garasanin, the National Party, under the leadership of Bishop Strossmayer, approached Serbia with the intention of cooperating, under its leadership, on the settlement of the Eastern Question and the creation of a federal state of Southern Slavs. As a result of this turnabout in the National Party's policy and its rapprochement with the Serbian government, an agreement was concluded between them in April 1867. It is quite certain that no political programme on collaboration, liberation and unification was ever recorded in the history of the Serbs and Croats in the 19th century that was more imbued with the Yugoslav spirit than the agreement which Garasanin offered the National Party.

The new tack in the National Party's policy was bound to bring about changes in the attitudes of its members towards the Serbs in Croatia, particularly since Ilija Garasanin himself appears to have taken certain steps in that respect.⁵⁹ A change in policy towards the Serbs was bound to happen also because of the need for closer links between the Serbs and Croats, so that united in the Croatian Sabor, which was to open on May 1, 1867, they could successfully withstand the strong pressures from Vienna and Budapest and the fairly strong Unionist Party, which wanted to persuade Croatia to make a compromise with Hungary.⁶⁰ As many Serbs supported the Unionist Party precisely because it was willing to recognize their separate national individuality, it was necessary for the National Party itself to change its stance on this question in the hope of winning over the Serbs. Bearing all this in mind, at the initiative of Jovan Subotic and at a special party meeting held on May 10, 1867, the National Party unanimously agreed to recognize the Serbs in Croatia. In order to create an impression in the public that the proposal originated from the Croats, it was decided that it should be submitted and explained in the Sabor by Ivan Voncina. He did it on the following day, May 11th, whereupon the Sabor solemnly declared that "the Triune Kingdom recognizes the Serbian people living in it as a nation identical and equal with the Croatian nation."

A few months earlier, after the shift in the National Party's policy, the Croatian Sabor had acceded to the Serbian requests concerning the designation and utilization of the official language in the Triune state. As the monarch did not ratify the Sabor's decision of 1861 about the Yugoslav language, partly because he did not believe that it suited all the citizens of Croatia,⁶² the Sabor altered this decision in January 1861 and proclaimed the "Croatian or Serbian language" as the official language.⁶³ This decision by the Sabor was preceded by the resolution of the Yugoslav Academy proposed by Djura Danicic and Jovan Subotic, that "the Academy shall call its language Croatian or Serbian."⁶⁴ These in fact were the first clear signs of a softening of the policy towards the Serbs. They paved the way to a Serb-Croat reconciliation which, cocking a snoot at Vienna and Budapest, was carried out in the Croatian Sabor on May 11, 1867, in a special declaration on recognition of the Serbs in Croatia.

With official and public recognition and acquisition of equal rights with the Croats, the Serbs had realized the principal objective of their national policy in Croatia. Having once overcome this major stumbling block, there were no further obstacles to a Serb-Croat rapprochement, harmony, and a joint national political action. The erstwhile critic of the Serbs and their policy as extremist, Bogoslav Sulek, a member of the National Party, now admitted that "since the Sabor's decision on equality between the Serbs and Croats, all the dissensions and disputes between us have been blown away, disappearing without a trace and hopefully forever. The Serbs have begun to really value and respect the Croats, and Matica Srpska declared through its spokesman that it will regard the Yugoslav Academy as the centre of all Yugoslav literature."⁶⁵

Just as the National Party was forced to give up its ideas on the settlement of the Eastern Question, the legal reconstitution of the Monarchy and policy toward the Serbs, so the Serbs, disappointed in their hopes for an equitable agreement with Hungarian politicians, had to abandon their plans about the dualist reorganization of the state and break away from the Unionist Party, which wanted the closest possible links between Croatia and Hungary. Having abandoned the Unionists, and aware of the threat to Croatia from Budapest and Vienna, a large number of Serbs joined the ranks of the National Party. It was even easier to do so for those Serbs who previously had advocated centralism and were affiliated with Mazuranic's Independent Party, because it was at that time that it amalgamated with the National Party.

After joining the ranks of the National Party, the Serbs from Croatia, particularly those from Srem, became protagonists of its anti-Hungarian and anti-Nagodba policy. Nowhere in Croatia, in no other county, did the National Party have so tight an organization and such a strong influence on the population as in Srem. Opposition to the policy conducted by Acting Ban Levin Rauch and the Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy was so great that the authorities lived in constant fear of a military mutiny and political putsch.⁶⁶ The National Party in Srem, led by Subotic, did bring about accord and unity between the Serbs and Croats, which undoubtedly was a result of the recognition of the Serbs in Croatia.⁶⁷ The political and electoral struggle against the Unionists and the unfair Nagodba was understood by the Serbs to be a part of the struggle of the Croatian people, who were not to be let down at a crucial moment, indeed a fateful moment of historical significance for the survival of the Croatian state. As so dramatically put by one Serbian verse-maker in a campaign song of 1867: "He who lets his brothers down, may he never enjoy good fortune; he who supports the foreigner against his brother, may he never have a son!" Another convincing testimony to the Serbs' high appreciation of the Croatian Sabor's decision to give them recognition was provided by Janko Tombor, a Catholic priest, who told the voters of the Erdevik district: "At the proposal of the National Party's committee and following the recommendation by the Serbian leaders, you have elected me, gentlemen and brothers, to be your representative in the Sabor. Having elected me, a Catholic clergyman, in this almost entirely Serbian Orthodox district, you have shown yourselves to be politically conscious and mature patriots, wanting to foster harmony among the Serbian and Croatian brothers of the same blood, not only in word but also in deed."⁶⁸

Thanks to the joint Serbo-Croat action, good organization and skilful conduct of policy, at the elections for the Croatian Sabor in 1867, the National Party returned five out of a total of fourteen deputies elected in the whole of Croatia. With this resounding electoral victory on the National Party ticket, the Serbs showed that Zastava was right to say that it was necessary first to meet their wishes before they could "wholeheartedly regard that country as their homeland and defend its constitution and independence against any assault."

When a critical view is taken of all the misunderstandings and conflicts over the name of the language and the recognition of Serbian national individuality, one forcibly comes to the conclusion that at the heart of all the mutually damaging clashes lay the idea of Croatian state and historical rights, which had kindled aspirations for a Greater Croatia and assimilation to produce an ethnically pure Croatian state. It is obvious that most of the Croat politicians renounced those tendencies at the moment of grave political crisis, when Croatian national, political and state interests were threatened,⁶⁹ and when it became clear that they could be successfully defended only in harmony and cooperation with the Serbs, which again could be assured after the fulfilment of their just demands. The well-informed Jovan Ristic, one of the Serbian Prince's regents, wrote on November 11, 1868: "The Croats would not acknowledge that there are Serbs in Croatia, but when the Hungarians pressed them to the wall, then they suddenly softened up. They wanted to draw us into their fight with the Hungarians, and after being saved with our help to carry on denying the existence of the Serbs."⁷⁰

Because the Serbs had gained the recognition of their national individuality in an emergency, when the Croatian Sabor had felt that "the noose was tightening," there were many among its members who voted for recognition under the pressure of events and not out of conviction. It is at any rate difficult to suppose that a majority of the Sabor, the same majority which in 1866 was not at all sympathetic to the Serbs, should out of the goodness of their hearts change its stance towards them overnight. This lack of sincerity was the cause of many subsequent Croatian and Serbian disputes, because the recognition of the Serbs granted in 1867 was soon forgotten, while non-recognition became the order of the day. As once again the leaders of the pack were Kvaternik's and Starcevic's Rightists, it may be opportune to quote here Kvaternik's evaluation of the Sabor's decision of May 11, 1867, for it reveals not only the causes but also the masterminds of all future misunderstandings. On September 10, 1868, Kvaternik wrote to Mihovil Pavlinovic: "What hope is there for the Croats when 'the nation's best sons' trampled underfoot the rights, blood, and nationality, and intelligence, by recognizing at their Sabor in 1867 that on the sacred Croatian soil, in addition to the Croatian nation and language, there are some other, Serbian people and language, laying equal claim with the Croats to our holy Croatian heritage? In view of this outrage against our people, does not your noble heart realize that camouflaged patriotism is jeopardizing the future of our people? Do these patriots not realize that the Serbs stand for Byzantine barbarity, as the Germans stand for Protestant treachery? They want to amalgamate us with those two peoples, turning the Croats away from French Catholicism, which protects our identity and religion." In short, according to Kvaternik, the Croatian Sabor committed an outrage by recognizing that in addition to the Croatian people and Croatian language, there were in Croatia a Serbian people and a Serbian language. Bearing in mind that such ideas, propounded by one of the founders of the Party of Rights, entered all its party political programmes, the Serbs, although by no means wanting it, were facing a tough struggle for the preservation of their national entity.

Biblioteka | Frontier In The National-Liberation Plans Of The Serbs And Croats 1860-1873

Copyright © 1997 by Vasilije Krestic
Copyright © 1997 by BIGZ , Beograd
Copyright © 1998 by Serbian Unity Congress