The 1848/49 revolution showed how important the Military Frontier could be when siding with the national movements of the Serbs and Croats, or when in the service of the reactionary interests of the Austrian government and the Habsburg dynasty. As the military might of the Frontier was employed for the benefit not of national but rather of Austrian reactionary interests, the Serbs and Croats were forced, after the collapse of the revolution and the imposition of the absolutist system of Alexander Bach, to cover up their true national aspirations and renounce all possible national liberation plans and actions. The defeat of the revolution, in which about 30,000 frontiersmen died in the fighting against the Hungarians and Italians,¹ temporarily arrested the national movements of the Serbs and Croats. Although they were on the side of victorious Austria, they were in fact defeated, and they needed some time to gather their wits and regroup their forces.

Nor did Serbia show much interest in national and political actions involving the Military Frontier. Rent by internal strife and having to cope with an unfavourable foreign political situation, Serbia was forced to mark time. It failed to keep up the conspiratorial and secret links which it had maintained with various national leaders from neighbouring areas,² and it was only when Ilija Garasanin again became the minister of internal affairs in 1858, that work started on organizing national propaganda. His plan was for Serbia to get hold of Bosnia at a convenient moment and bring it within its own state borders. An important role was reserved in this action for the frontiersmen, but only those "who were of the opinion that Bosnia should be made ready for Serbia." Fearing that Austria might lay hands on Bosnia, Garasanin did not trust either the Croats or Bishop Strossmayer. "Although they act on behalf of the Croatian people, it means nothing other than working for Austria, to which Croatia is totally subordinated," wrote Garasanin. In order to secure Bosnia for Serbia, the Serbian statesman asked for collaboration with frontier officers to be established very cautiously, suspecting that those of the Catholic faith might be under the influence of Croatian or Austrian propaganda. Garasanin sought to win over those officers who were reliably known to be honest and ready to serve the Serbian national idea, by offering them prospects of "ensuring their future with Serbia and in Serbia."³

Because of an insufficient number of trained officers, following the enthronement of Prince Mihailo, the government of Serbia, led by Garasanin, drafted a plan for the recruitment of frontier officers to the Serbian army. The idea was to satisfy as much as possible the military needs of the country without unduly burdening state finances. Therefore, the invitation was to be sent only to those officers of the Military Frontier who were loyal to Serbia and possessed good military training and expertise, in which the Serbian Army was lacking. As a rule, they were not be above the rank of captain, should be in good physical condition, and of an age permitting a long expectation of service. The career officers joining the Serbian Army would immediately receive a rank above their current one, and the years spent in the Austrian army counted as if they had been spent in the Serbian army service. The frontier officers who had voluntarily quit the Austrian army and were employed in various state and public services of the Monarchy, if admitted, received in Serbia the military rank which they had when they left the army, while the years of both military and civil service in Austria were acknowledged as if served in the Principality of Serbia. Officers who had been cashiered from the army and those who had resigned from army service as a rule were not inducted into Serbia's service. If, however, their dismissal or resignations were not occasioned by a felony or a punishment, such officers could apply to be admitted to the Serbian Army without any privileges. They were not given a higher rank, nor did their earlier service in Austria count toward their pension. Only in exceptional cases, for special services, not by right but by privilege, these officers could subsequently have their earlier service recognized. Retired Military Frontier officers could also join the Serbian Army, but they were expected to renounce the pension earned in Austria. Officers who may have "rendered considerable services to Serbia" and after retirement had become reactivated in the Serbian Army, were allowed to draw their pensions and also benefits from the years spent in the service of Serbia.⁴

The guidelines on inviting and admitting frontier officers into the Serbian Army were applied in practice only after the crisis triggered off by the Turkish bombardment of Belgrade in 1862. Prior to the bombardment, in April 1862, the Serbian Army was joined by Captain Antonije Oreskovic, who received the rank of infantry major. After the bombardment, in September of the same year, Adam Priljeva was invited to come to Serbia and received the rank of a captain of the engineers corps, second class. A month later, the Serbian Army was joined by Djura Horvatovic and Lazar Jovanovic, who were promoted to the rank of captain second class; then Tanasije Curcic, who became a full lieutenant, Aleksandar Cvetic, Aleksandar Protic, Paja Popovic, Glisa Frenic, Jeronim Sandor, and Aleksa Savic, who became sergeants. Even later, until the Military Frontier was abolished, its officers kept coming to the Serbian Army.⁵

It is interesting that they included both Serbs and Croats, more of the former, of course, which is understandable, but it is difficult to believe that they were motivated to cross over to Serbia only by a desire to further their careers or ensure their livelihood. At any rate, they were screened before coming to Serbia, and, as we have said, were expected to be loyal to the Serbian national idea. This is a fact which needs to be particularly emphasized, for it shows that among the frontier officers of Croatian nationality there were many who had no quarrel with Serbia and who did not regard it as Croatia's rival in the national liberation and unification actions. Likewise, although Serbia had good reason to be mistrustful of Austrian and Catholic propaganda, it did not reject Croatian-born officers without a reason, but admitted them under the same conditions and permitted them the same opportunities of advancement in the service as were open to the Serbs.

The diplomatic archives of Tsarist Russia show that the disgruntled inhabitants of the Military Frontier, disenchanted with their position after the 1848/49 revolution and during Bach's absolutism, refused to blindly follow Austria's policy and sacrifice their lives for the interests of the Habsburg court and dynasty. This was made obvious in the Austrian war against Italy, in the battles fought in the plains of Lombardy. The frontiersmen's demeanour was so spiritless that some contemporaries thought this was the reason for Austria's defeats at Magenta and Solferino. Less interested in Austria's fate than before, frontiersmen devoted more attention to Bosnia and the population there, which led Russian diplomats to believe that the Military Frontier could be made use of in an action for the liberation of Bosnia. The Russian politicians who monitored events relating to the Frontier wondered who would make the best use of its military potential - Austria or Serbia. Although the frontiersmen were unhappy about Austria's policy, few people believed that they would rise against it. However, Russian diplomats supposed that Austria, in an attempt to get hold of Bosnia, would enlist the aid of the Croatian bourgeois strata, particularly those rallied behind the National Party under Strossmayer. Insufficiently strong to effect the unification of Southern Slavs themselves, the representatives of the National Party, in the opinion of the Russian consul general in Belgrade Vlangali, were compelled to ask help from Austria, which would use it to further its own political and national interests.⁶

Both Serbian and Croatian politicians in the early 1860s were hoping to turn to the advantage of their own national aspirations the frontiersmen's readiness to place their arms in the service of the liberation of Bosnia. An open conflict could easily have broken out over this issue, because the point in question was who would get Bosnia, but the two interested parties could also have cooperated. It has already been noted that Garasanin suspected that Croatia's and Bishop Strossmayer's actions for the liberation and annexation of Bosnia to Croatia were actually sponsored by Austria. As Russian diplomatic officials had come to similar conclusions, this question is worth dwelling upon.

Bishop Strossmayer's memorandums to Austrian Prime Minister Rechberg written at the end of 1860 show that the Bishop assigned to Austria "a lofty mission" in the settlement of the Eastern Question, that he tried hard to divert its entire policy towards the Balkans so that at the crucial moment, Bosnia and Hercegovina would "drop like a ripe pear." Strossmayer promised Austria Croatia's help in its "important mission" in the East, mainly help from the Military Frontier, which, as he wrote, had to "serve the interest of the Monarchy," by committing the frontiersmen to a war against Turkey for the liberation of their Christian brothers.⁷ Because of his desire to secure Bosnia for Croatia, and because of the plan to solve the Eastern Question with the help of the Military Frontier, Strossmayer, during the sitting of the 1861 Croatian Sabor, strove to preserve the Krajina as a military institution, but under special conditions. He wanted the same laws for both Civil Croatia and the Military Frontier, the Sabor to be the same for both regions, and the civil administration to be based upon the same foundations, "and the Military Frontier may subsist until we see what is going to happen to the Eastern Question."⁸ Strossmayer's attitude to the Military Frontier and its role was supported by other politicians close to him.

The role and significance of Croatia in the Eastern Question was stressed in a memorandum of the 1861 Sabor. The Monarch was openly told that a unified Croatia in Southern Europe could strengthen "Your Majesty's throne." In another memorandum, the king was asked to make sure that at a suitable moment Bosnia should be attached to Croatia.⁹ The well-known politician Stjepan Ivicevic, close to Strossmayer and his national ideas, wrote in a political programme that the Varazdin Krajina should be abolished, and the rest of the Frontier "maintained until it completes its mission in the East," with the help and under the aegis of Austria. He was referring to Francis Joseph's letter of November 8, 1861, dissolving the Croatian Sabor. In this letter, the monarch rejected the Sabor's demand for the abolition of the Frontier, explaining it in the following words: "The system of the Military Frontier, existing at present in the area which is administratively separated from the complex of the mother kingdom, is still of such importance not only for the strength of the state as a whole but also for the political prestige and the future of this dearest kingdom, that we need only draw your attention to it, and my faithful subjects will see at once that both the political situation and the interests of the mother kingdom recommend that this system should not be essentially changed." After this statement by Francis Joseph, everyone was clear about the task for the Military Frontier and for whom it was expected to fight. Twenty years later, Ivan Voncina wrote that no one doubted that "His Majesty, laying stress on the political prestige and national future of the Triune Kingdom, had in mind the great task which Croatia would perform when the time came, thanks to its geographical location, in some parts of the Balkan peninsula, with the help of Krajina, and no one doubts that this time is not and cannot be very distant." The king's reply to the demand for the annexation of the Frontier, according to Voncina, calmed down many members of the National Party "and softened the ardour with which its immediate abolition was desired and demanded."

Garasanin does not seem to have been overly suspicious about the links between the Croatian politicians led by Strossmayer and the official circles of Austria as regards the Military Frontier and aspirations to attach Bosnia to Croatia and the Monarchy. Early in the 1860s, the political paths of the Serbs and Croats began to diverge. They were mutually exclusive because their points of departure were different. The essence of the dispute lay in the fact that the Serbs, in their struggle for liberation, unification, and extension of their national borders, invariably came up against Austria as a powerful opponent; whereas the Croats, at least those from Strossmayer's National Party, saw in the Monarchy reconstituted on a federalist basis the protector and supporter of their national aspirations. Because of such different and mutually opposing policies on the Eastern and South Slav questions, distrust and rivalry reigned for many years between Belgrade and Zagreb. In the dispute over Bosnia and leadership of the programme to unify the South Slavs, the Serbs and Croats were not disposed to conduct a joint action in the Military Frontier. Each side acted on its own, following its own programmes and objectives, and only occasionally were good relations restored and a common language found.

It is clear from the foregoing that claims to the effect that Krajina Serbs, above all Orthodox priests and some Serbian journalists, including the Srbski dnevnik of Novi Sad, served the interests of military and court circles in Serbia, are completely unfounded. These circles allegedly aided Serbs in their separatist tendencies, and this is meant to explain why the Serbs demanded "a formal constitution for the Military Frontier with one sabor, which would be held at Petrinja." To understand such demands, it is necessary to know more than just the history of Croatia and the Croats. It should be remembered that the territory of the Military Frontier is just as much Serbian as it is Croatian, and there must be an equal knowledge of the history of both peoples. At any rate, the "separatist" aspirations of the Krajina Serbs were not instigated by military and court circles. Anyone even the least familiar with the history of the Serbian national movement in Hungary, the political tack of Srbski dnevnik and the men contributing to it, could certainly not link up the "separatist" aspirations allegedly expressed in its columns with military and court circles. Their policies simply were a result of the national aims and aspirations of the Serbs. There were so many Serbs in the lands of the Military Frontier, not only Croatian, but also Hungarian, that they could well think of the creation of a separate autonomous region, which they had always wanted. Furthermore, by separating the Military Frontier, they could try to hamstring Croatia, preventing it from expanding and strengthening and becoming an even more powerful competitor to the Principality of Serbia, which the Serb frontiersmen expected would bring Bosnia within its national borders. The Serbs from Croatia and Hungary had constantly endeavoured to make their voice heard by the authorities, to become a factor without which the question of the abolishment of the Military Frontier could not be resolved. For these reasons, it was decided at the Annunciation Serbian National Congress held at Sremski Karlovci in 1861, that the Military Frontier could only be abolished "subject to the agreement of a national convention of the Serbs of Eastern Orthodox confession from Hungary, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and the Military Frontier."

Finally, as regards the "separatist" aspirations of the Krajina Serbs, which have not yet been properly researched, the Serbs wanted to know what they would get from unification with Civil Croatia, what would await them in this new community. That they were not prepared for unification without clear information about it is shown in a letter from a group of frontiersmen to the grand zupan of the county of Zagreb, Ivan Kukuljevic, in 1865, following this county's demand for the Krajina to be attached to Croatia. The frontiersmen claimed that this demand was unfeasible in the existing circumstances, that not even the elementary conditions for it had been met. They were called "Vlachs" and "Swabians" (Germans) by the county inhabitants, they wrote, and no single frontiersman ever received employment, even the most lowly one of janitor, in the county services. Clearly the nationally conscious Serbs could not reconcile themselves to be Vlachs or Swabians in the new community, to be deprived of their national name, to be discriminated against and socially deprived.

When on account of differing objectives and mutually opposed national plans the Serbs and Croats found themselves unable to make use of the Military Frontier in union, they undertook their actions separately. One of the first was the action which in August 1860 was organized by Matija Ban, when he set up in Belgrade a Serbo-Bosnian Committee, under the patronage of Metropolitan Mihailo. The Committee's task was to organize an uprising in Bosnia and Hercegovina with the aim of attaching these areas to Serbia. The Committee received financial aid from Russian Slavophiles in Moscow, and Ban informed the Russian government of the action. He asked Russia make sure that in the event of an uprising, the big powers should not intervene in events in the Balkans. Ban's action was approved both by Prince Gorchakov, minister of foreign affairs, and Tsar Alexander II. To prepare an uprising against Turkey, Ban set up along the Bosnian-Hercegovinian borders a chain of reliable persons and agencies with the job of forming armed companies which would move into action once the uprising broke out and of setting up ammunition dumps. Agencies were created in Dalmatia, along the entire Croato-Slavonian Military Frontier and in Serbia. In this action, which was conducted under the slogan "God, Prince, and Serbia," Ban collaborated with the Croats and won over several Catholic priests. What is more, from his papers it would seem that in December 1860 he had come to an agreement with the Croatian National Party, which he had allegedly persuaded in favour of the unification of Croatia with Serbia for the creation of a large federal Yugoslav state. In one report Ban wrote: "With the Croats I have laid down the foundations of our future Serbo-Croatian policy and averted them from separatism, towards which they had begun to tend. Nevertheless, they know nothing about our doings and made me their plenipotentiary in Sardinia in the event of a Venetian war. I have all their secrets in my hands, and they do not have an inkling about ours." The chief agent of Matija Ban in Croatia was the Serb Paja Cavlovic, former editor of the outlawed newspaper Branislav, which had been published in Belgrade in 1844 and 1845.

Up until the end of 1860, Ban pursued his own programme without the knowledge of the Serbian government. From the beginning of 1861 up until mid-May, when his financial aid from Russia dried up, the Serbian government was informed about everything but refused to finance Ban's action. Realizing that there were many so-called agents who purported to work on behalf of Serbia but in fact were only using her name while working for themselves, Garasanin decided to organize national propaganda by putting everything under the supervision of the Serbian government. Since Matija Ban's action was organized without the knowledge and consent of the government, in May 1861, Prince Mihailo ordered him to disband his organization.²⁰ Although it did not achieve any notable success, it is interesting because it had a pronounced Yugoslav character. With its multifarious activities, and even by virtue of its very existence, Ban's action had forced the government to organize as soon and as effectively as possible its own national and political propaganda. It was forced to do so because the self-styled agitators, who could not always be supervised, might provoke undesired international complications, of which it was wary.

A few months after the setting up of the Serbo-Bosnian Committee, late in November 1860, Ban Sokcevic sent a pro memoria to the Austrian minister of war. When informed about events in the south of the Monarchy and in the Balkans, Sokcevic supposed that the war which was being prepared for Italy against Austria might well spread to the Balkan countries and the peoples in the south of the Monarchy. As his objective was to protect Austria from any possible aggravations, the Croatian Ban believed that its safety would be best secured through the Military Frontier, whose loyalty was not doubted in Vienna. His proposal was essentially for Austria to occupy Bosnia using frontier troops. In this way he would put an end to the unrest there and forestall its spread to Austrian territory. Although the highest military circles in Austria were fully aware that liberatory actions were being prepared in the Slav-inhabited part of Turkey, Sokcevic's proposal was not taken up for financial and political reasons.

Movements in Bosnia were expected in the spring of 1861, and it was actually at the beginning of the year that Strossmayer asked the ban, in the event of the outbreak of an uprising, to send the Bosnians frontier units which were stationed in Slavonia.²² It is quite understandable that the assistance, sent by an imperial general, would help Austria strengthen its grip on a province which it wanted to appropriate for itself. But almost at the same time as he asked the Ban to send frontier units to aid Bosnian insurgents, the Bishop attempted to establish closer contacts with the government of Serbia and Prince Mihailo. He did that in February 1861, through the already mentioned Stjepan Ivicevic, who during his encounter with Prince Mihailo in Belgrade, "openly spoke of the need for joint action by the Serbs and Croats in Bosnia."²³ This would suggest that Strossmayer, in seeking ways to liberate and unify the Southern Slavs, was already prepared to amplify and even change his fundamental federalist orientation. It is obvious that he did not want to stick to federalism at any price, but it took him a long time to give up the solution which provided the easiest means of fulfilling Croatia's national ideals. At any rate, Strossmayer was one of those astute politicians who in pursuing their national aims reveal exceptional flexibility. He demonstrated this flexibility in respect of the Military Frontier and its role in dealing with the Croatian and the South Slav questions. We have already said that in 1860 and during the session of the 1861 Sabor, the Bishop wanted the Military Frontier, because of its "mission in the East," to be preserved under special conditions as a military institution. He expected that Austria would introduce a federal system in which a unified Croatia, joined by Bosnia, would receive the status of a separate federal unit. As nothing was done about the Krajina in 1861 or later, and Austria in the meanwhile experimented with centralism, Strossmayer concluded that certain favourable opportunities had been missed and early in 1863 declared himself in favour of its complete abolition and annexation to Croatia.²⁴

Stjepan Ivicevic's meeting with Prince Mihailo and talks about possible cooperation between the Serbs and Croats did to change relations between the Serbian government and the leadership of the Croatian National Party. The earlier distrust, as well as the reasons which caused it, continued to exist. To what extent this distrust was related to the Military Frontier and its utilization in a possible liberation action can be realized from the following words of Ilija Garasanin: "Action in the Croatian Military Frontier may be regarded as lost for us. Either Austria knows about this business and is using the Croats for its own purposes, or if it does not, it can easily thwart it the moment it starts happening. At any rate, a great deal of noise has been made about the preparations in the Croatian Military Frontier, so it is hardly possible that Austria does not know what is going on and is not following it with a keen eye. When the place from which action is to be mounted against Bosnia is in Austrian hands, it is easy to guess what would happen in the fateful moment. The uprising in the Krajina²⁵ could be aided only from the Austrian border, and once Austria cuts off all communications with the insurgent area, what success can we expect from such an action? It will fail by itself, because it would not be aided from Austria, and since people from other areas will not rise at the same time and to the same extent, failure is certain. It would be even worse if Austria were to support the movement and use it for its own ends. This is what would most likely happen. It should not be forgotten that the Croatian Sabor has publicly referred to the need for unification of Turkish Croatia with Austrian Croatia, and that subsequently some Turks from the Krajina had gone to the Ban in Zagreb to make him offers in the same sense.²⁶ These events should be borne in mind. Also significant is the information mentioned in passing by Friar Kuna,²⁷ to the effect that Bishop Strossmayer is aware of all our actions along the Croatian Military Frontier, and that he had promised on his part to provide 30,000 forints of his own money and that he would join the movement in person, crucifix in hand. Whether Strossmayer promises to do this for the interests of Serbia or of Austria is not difficult to guess."²⁸

The demand voiced in the Croatian Sabor for the so-called Turkish Croatia, i.e., the Bosnian Krajina, to go to the Triune Kingdom, was received in the Serbian government as fresh evidence that cooperation with the Croats was still not possible. To make sure that the Bosnian Krajina would go not to Croatia but to Serbia, Garasanin's deputy for propaganda in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Tomo Kovacevic, was in favour of a campaign among the local population to awaken and strengthen Serbian national consciousness. He supposed that in the event of the outbreak of a general uprising, the Croats would want not only the Bosnian Krajina but the whole of Bosnia. In one scenario of the uprising to be aided by Dalmatia and the Military Frontier, which he proposed early in May 1862, he warned the government of Serbia to reflect "how much and what sort of aid to ask for from Croatian patriots," pointing out that "it would not be amiss to have friends among them who would aid the uprising morally and financially."²⁹

Cooperation with the Croats was not begun even after this proposal by Tomo Kovacevic. Ante Oreskovic, who particularly urged joint action by the Serbs and Croats, wrote on July 16, 1862, to Andrija Torkvat Brlic that the Serbian government did not trust Strossmayer, because he gave money to Bishop Frantovic for Bosnia, while as regards Strossmayer's attitude to Oreskovic himself, who had written to him through Luka Botic, "he either does not care for me or he is much too smart and too cautious."³⁰

If at this time there had been no proper cooperation yet with Strossmayer and the National Party, there were some contacts with a group of Croats, partisans of Eugen Kvaternik. The leader of the future Rightists noted in his diary that as early as 1862, his followers, although they had "bared their teeth at the Serbs in the Sabor in 1861, sent young men to Serbia, to the legion, when they asked for our advice."

It is also interesting that Oreskovic, in March 1862 and before coming to Belgrade, informed Eugen Kvaternik that he was collaborating with Serbia and that he intended with their assistance to stage an uprising in Bosnia. Oreskovic wanted to meet Kvaternik and hear his opinion about the entire undertaking. Kvaternik, on his part told him that he attached no significance to his action, that all those intending to take part in it were to be pitied because Ban Sokcevic was informed about everything. Kvaternik knew that Paja Cavlovic had in public houses threatened Oreskovic by name, and warned him to watch his step and not to "play with fire."^&

Biblioteka | The Military Frontier and the Insurrection in Poland