

## WHY THE BALKANS?

By David Binder

This commentary was delivered by David Binder at a discussion held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on March 1, 2000.

*About the author: David Binder,*



*Independent journalist and former New York Times correspondent for the Balkans and Eastern Europe.*

At the beginning of

this new century, we may ask what problems we inherited, unresolved, from the last century. One of those problems is the Balkans. No other region caused such grief to so many foreign empires in the 20th century. The Ottoman Empire declined and fell there in 1912. Austro-Hungarian Empire started World War I over an assassination in Sarajevo and collapsed in 1918. The Italian empire of Mussolini and the The Third Reich of Hitler invaded and occupied but never completely subdued the Balkans. The first setback to Stalin's Soviet empire was the successful breakout of Tito's Yugoslavia in 1948.

The Balkan peninsula was long a tempting playground for foreign forces, but they usually transformed it into a wasteland of grinding destruction and bloodshed. There was an inward effect as well. Dividing Balkan nations either into vassals or implacable enemies, the empires prevented the indigenous peoples from developing normal relations with each other. Further, they were discouraged from developing their own political life beyond the stage of satrapies or petty despotisms. In 1991, as Yugoslavia -- free of foreign domination for scarcely 40 years -- plunged into dissolution amid fierce

ethnic fighting, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said repeatedly it might be best to leave the various factions to fight it out until they couldn't fight any more, and then they would go to the negotiating table. "I am personally of the view Kosovo, that the only thing that may bring it to an end," he said, "is when all of the participants are exhausted."

As cold-blooded as this approach might have seemed, how many thousands of lives might have been spared, how many people might have been able to remain in their homes instead of joining desperate refugee treks? I am not suggesting that the outcomes of the various conflicts would have been benign in such a scenario, just a good deal shorter, less bloody, and less destructive.

Where is the error of the approach taken by the United States and its European allies to the problem of Yugoslavia, throughout the 1990s? I think that it lies in their belief that they could succeed where others failed and then, to choose sides narrowly in what inevitably became a series of civil wars: here uniformly innocent victims, there uniformly genocidal aggressors; here ethnic cleansers, there the ethnically cleansed.

Did it not register with the strategists in Washington, London or Bonn that in World War II, Croats "cleansed" far more Serbs than Serbs "cleansed" Croats; if one can call extermination of tens of thousands in the Jasenovac death camp "cleansing?" Or, that Albanians, with backing of Ottoman Turks, followed by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany pushed far more Serbs out of Kosovo than vice versa.

The population figures before the NATO bombing campaign make simple testimony: 80 percent Albanian and 20 percent non-Albanian. At the root lies a simplistic dogma that blames one nation, the Serbs, as the origin of evil in the Balkans. It is an unwritten doctrine adopted by the State Department at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflicts and

continued today, a doctrine endorsed and spread by the mainstream media, human rights groups and even some religious communities. It is a doctrine also embraced by Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, who declared unabashedly before Albanians in Gnjilane last December that "Kosovo does not belong to anyone except the Kosovars." He further added: "I feel very close to the Albanian people. . . . I love all peoples but some more than others and that is the case with you."

The indisputable reality of the Balkans is that none of its peoples has been an altogether innocent victim of vicious neighbors. Except possibly the Roma. All were complicit at one time or another in killing, rape, plunder and burning. And this was true in the first and second Balkan war, true in both World Wars and true in all of the Yugoslav civil wars of the 1990s.

Yes, more than 300,000 Croats were displaced during combat with Serbs in 1991. But more than 300,000 Croatian Serbs became refugees as a result of the American-fostered Croatian offensives of 1995 in the Krajina region.

Yes, more than one million Bosnian Muslims were driven from their homes by Serb and Croat offensives. Few have been able to return. But 400,000 Bosnian Serbs and tens of thousands of Bosnian Croats were also forced into exile by the Muslims.

Yes, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo in the spring of 1999. Yet there is a curiosity documented by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from the 78-day bombing campaign in terms of "cleansing": the OSCE found that 863,000 Albanians left Kosovo, roughly 46 percent of the total. But it also reported that 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins fled Kosovo in the same period, this constituting about 60 percent of the total. Proportionately, more Serbs were displaced during the bombing, and they -- unlike the Albanians whose majority returned

despite rampant destruction of their homes -- did not return to Kosovo. A new exodus then commenced, as the unleashed fury of the Albanians wreaked hideous vengeance on Serbs, Roma and even ethnic Turks -- shooting, knifing, strangling, grenading, shelling, burning -- killing more than 1,000 people. This happened and continues to happen under the guns of the 37,000 soldiers of the KFOR occupation force deployed by NATO.

Against this background of intimidation and threat it is estimated that 250,000 non-Albanians have fled Kosovo since the NATO bombing ceased. I am persuaded that much of this could have been avoided. Retracing NATO's steps in June, the inundation of arms in Kosovo could have been largely prevented rather early by sealing Kosovo's borders to Albania and Macedonia and then filtering the Albanian returnees to make sure the KLA was not bringing weapons back to the region. Instead, NATO settled for a voluntary and totally ineffective disarming of the Kosovo Liberation Army last summer. Attacks on Serbs and others have not diminished since then while Kosovo's Albanians remain armed to teeth.

Incidentally, it was reported in February that some 200,000 people have moved since the summer from Albania to Kosovo, which despite the destruction caused by Serbs and NATO bombing is still better off than the ancestral lands to the south.

Going back to the days before the bombing, I believe that if the United States and its allies had taken a calmer view of the situation, much death and destruction could have been avoided. Possibly even the seemingly endless cycle of ethnic revenge could have been halted.

A year ago after a difficult start, the American-inspired Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) numbering more than 1,000 personnel was beginning to get traction, separating the Serbian military and police forces from the Kosovo Liberation Army and enabling thousands of displaced Albanians to return to their homes. The final report to OSCE by a German general who was part of KDOM confirms this.

In its hubris, however, the Clinton Administration sought more dramatic results -- amounting to abject submission of the Serbs to NATO rule. This was the message of Rambouillet. Had the observer mission been allowed to continue, I think Kosovo would have been a much gentler, happier place today.

Perhaps someday we will discover whether the White House chose, as some suspect, a Kosovo scenario as a deliberate shift of focus away from the domestic turmoil caused by the impeachment. Perhaps we will learn how much importance the Kosovo operations, and Bosnia before it, had in Administration plans to turn NATO into an instrument of American foreign policy, and to assert American primacy in Europe. Perhaps an explanation will come to light about how Washington could list the Kosovo Liberation Army among the

world's terrorist organizations in 1997, could denounce it as a "terrorist group" in February 1998, and then turn around 180 degrees overnight and embrace it as a formation of freedom fighters, and then install it as a legitimate political force in the summer of 1999. This sudden shift occurred despite disclosures of links between the KLA and Albanian heroin trafficking rings in Italy, Switzerland, Germany and other European countries, and the connection of the KLA leader Hashim Thaci to assassinations of Albanian rivals. Perhaps the Administration could one day also dispel the mystery of why United Nations Police could be ordered last January to cease surveillance of the Thaci family after his brother was charged with illegal possession of weapons and of \$791,000 in cash, and then released.

Even without light being shed on those behind-the-scene developments I believe that the 11 billion dollar military campaign against the Serbs and for the Albanians was largely a failure. And it was a failure for the following reasons:

- We know it greatly accelerated the flight of Albanians from Kosovo;
- It did not substantially hurt the Serb military;
- It did billions in pointless damage to civilian infrastructure throughout Serbia and Kosovo Province (for which NATO countries will end up paying some of the repairs).
- It left Slobodan Milosevic, the named and targeted enemy, firmly in power. It seems his time in office might outlast that of General Wesley Clark at NATO -- and perhaps he will out-stay President Clinton; and
- It sucked the United States and NATO into an open-ended commitment with no exit strategy.

Military and political planners themselves acknowledged that the strategy was deeply flawed, that they were shocked when the Serbs did not capitulate after three days of bombs and had difficulty agreeing what to do next.

In the wake of the Cold War, some view the United States as the last great imperial power. I contend that the Balkan adventure of the United States in the last decade shows that if it is indeed imperialistic then it is essentially haphazard and makeshift in execution.

A truly serious power would have discerned immediately and clearly that Kosovo was not so much a military problem as a policing problem -- as was the case under the Serbs -- and prepared for it. The unarmed KDOM observers had demonstrated that. The Serb military was not going to be an obstacle -- they withdrew, and on time. But all of a sudden there was a total absence of authority on the Serbian side and, among the Albanians, power swiftly gravitated to the men

with guns. NATO, trained in conventional warfare, was hopelessly disadvantaged by Albanian groups experienced in hit and run and guerrilla tactics. Besides, it appears, few NATO commanders cared what happened to Kosovo's remaining non-Albanians. Their ears were still full of the Serb guilt broadcast by NATO's superb propaganda machine. Frankly, Kosovo has been an indigestible stone in the stomach of the Balkans for at least the last hundred years. It promises to be just as indigestible for the international community for decades longer.

Thanks in considerable part to feckless interventions by a succession of imperial powers, its previous multiethnic character has been all but eradicated. But that does not make Kosovo any more compatible to its surroundings. On the contrary, I believe that an ethnically cleansed Albanian Kosovo threatens to destabilize southeastern Serbia, where there is an ethnic Albanian minority of 80,000, as well as destabilize Albania itself and Macedonia by way of its ambition to serve as the motor of a Greater Albania. In short, Kosovo remains a time bomb.

Looking back over the last 30 years, we find ample evidence that despite the desire of many Kosovo Albanians to live peaceably with their Slavic neighbors there was always an implacable core who demanded independence. Even the Gandhi-like passive resistance led by Ibrahim Rugova was unrelenting in this. The slogans changed slightly but their aim was the same. During the decade of Slobodan Milosevic's ascendancy in Kosovo, the majority of Albanians boycotted virtually everything that was Serb, including Federal elections where their compact voting bloc could have helped oust Milosevic. Fundamental separation had already occurred before NATO began to preside over the final phase of the ethnic cleansing of the remaining Serbs that got under way last June. Consequently, we should not be surprised that most Albanians seek to expel every Serb, even erase every sign of Serb culture -- witness the destruction of eighty Orthodox churches and monasteries, many of them matchless medieval monuments.

At the end of the bombing campaign President Clinton triumphantly declared that NATO would "protect all the people of that troubled land, Serbs and Albanians alike." But, as demonstrated, these preachings on the virtues of multicultural, multiethnic societies meant nothing to Albanians.

Believing as I do in the ad hoc essence of American exercise of power in the world, I wonder how long the Congress and the electorate will be willing to put up with a seemingly eternal commitment of thousands of soldiers and billions of tax dollars to a protectorate in Bosnia and a protectorate in Kosovo. Add to that the costs of proto-protectorates in Albania, Macedonia and -- who knows? -- Montenegro. Already we hear signs of disillusionment: Defense Secretary Cohen complains about "mission creep," Chief of Staff

General Shelton states that his troops are only "marking time" in Kosovo.

To try a little Kremlinology: in his State of the Union speech in 1999, President Clinton devoted thirty-five words to Kosovo, saying that: "With our NATO allies we are pressing the Serbian government to stop its brutal repression in Kosovo, to bring those responsible to justice and to give the people of Kosovo the self government they deserve." Last January, he only had thirty words to say about Kosovo: "we should be proud of the men and women of our armed forces who stopped the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, enabling a million people to return to their homes."

I can imagine some playwright of the future reflecting on the history of our absurd times and finding it rich in dramatic material:

- An American president who shakes hands with a Balkan despot. Later the despot is indicted and the president is at least nominally considered for indictment by a war crimes tribunal.
- An American general visits a Serb general and accepts a ceremonial pistol from him only to find that is politically incorrect, so he denounces him as a war criminal.
- A secretary of state calls for a shower of bombs on the very city where she spent happy childhood days.

Not long ago, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, a guest of the Wilson Center, took a little time at the outset of his speech to damn rather than praise Woodrow Wilson as "at least a partial failure if measured by the consequences of his actions." In Holbrooke's rereading and rewriting of history, Wilson's fourteen points which called for the self-determination of the South Slavic peoples among others "led directly to the disasters that befell us in Bosnia and Kosovo and elsewhere... Creating a single country out of what was once Yugoslavia never made any sense," he added.

As on other occasions when dealing with the Balkans, Holbrooke didn't do his homework. The idea of Yugoslavia was born, before any of the 14 points were conceived, out of the fear of Slovenes, Croats and others of the designs of imperial powers on their lands. The collapse of Yugoslavia was due similarly to its brutal subjugation by Nazi Germany and then by Communism and not as a result of Wilsonian idealism about multiethnic states.

Oddly, the American approach to the Central Balkans in the last decade has been Wilsonian self-determination gone wild, with some help from Ambassador Holbrooke. Aided and abetted by some European countries, the United States has had a decisive hand in creating not arguably fragile multiethnic states such as the Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia of Wilson's day but mono-ethnic ministates -- Croatia,

Slovenia and, even more grotesque, a Bosnia-Herzegovina that is ethnically divided three ways. Like it or not the Clinton Administration is now presiding over the evolution of yet another mono-ethnic state -- an Albanian Kosovo.

To put it another way, the US and NATO, though it was the opposite of their declared intentions, have far outstripped everyone else in ethnic cleansings in the Balkans.

## THE FINAL JUDGMENT

*Adapted from "Epilog" by Dr. Samuel J. Mikolski (who holds a D. Phil. degree in Theology from Oxford University) published in the book "Kosovo Crisis: A Study In Foreign Policy Mismanagement" by V. Joksimovic (Graphics Management Press, 1999).*

"Upon his inauguration, President Bill Clinton boasted that unlike past American administrations, his regime would signal the "Triumph of Virtue." The American public has learned to impute the exact opposite meaning to any moral statement Bill Clinton makes." "...The list of immoralities out of which the Kosovo aggression flows and that seek to justify that aggression is long and distasteful - an offense to a great nation founded upon principles of truth, equity, and justice."

"... Bill Clinton has spent his life honing the skill of vernal jousting - excursion into nonmeaning, the art of verbal justification, and the immorality of spin....Jack Fuller, former editor of the Chicago Tribune, writing in the Los Angeles Times on May 31, 1999, defines spin as "manipulation of perception, particularly delivered up through media." ... Fuller points to the irony - boomers resisted accepting administration lies about the Vietnam War, but accepted Clinton's lies about Kosovo. Gesture is more important than deed; attitude in being able to "pull it off" more substantive than reality; and polishing the image, not pursuit of moral veracity, is the quest. But when spin is king, we lose all sense of authenticity - of the factualism that is the ground of truth...far from the premise that objectivity is a myth, upon which spin is based, it is vital that facts and interpretations that are at variance with one's own views be presented with as much emphasis as the version the presenter favors. True journalism gives the reader or viewer at least the opportunity to judge. Clinton's policy is to:load the dice," and the truth be damned."

"...The Clinton administration does not have the approval of Congress for this aggression against a sovereign state that has not attacked or invaded any of its neighbors nor threatened us or our vital interests. Aggression by the United States and NATO has violated both the spirit and the letter of the Helsinki Accord, which ensures the inviolability of national borders, and the United Nations (UN) charter. They bypassed both the UN Security Council and the General Assembly but sought the imprimatur of the United Nations upon the results of an unprovoked,

illegal aggression. No amount of redefinition to avoid the term "war" can justify what is in fact war and naked aggression."

## The Immorality of Unjust War

"The injustice of was concerns not only of the evils of the bombing but, as well, the folly and recklessness of persisting in courses of action that inevitably led to predicted humanitarian disaster. How many died in Yugoslavia because of the bombing - Serbs, Muslims, Romanies, Jews, and others? How many died in Kosovo and in the refugee camps through starvation, disease, exposure, and violence? NATO refuses to divulge the data"

"The Clinton administration was quick to halt bombing during Muslim holy days in Iraq, but not for the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Easter. The pope had asked for a ten-day halt to bombing. It should be recalled that when Hitler bombed Belgrade in 1941, he allowed three days for Yugoslavs to bury their dead. But it is a burlesque of history that a German general ruled out a halt to the NATO bombing because, he said, it would give Slobodan Milosevic time to regroup his resistance to NATO. The possibility of an exponentially heightened horror, that of bombing the bridges of Belgrade while they were densely filled with Belgrade citizens who voluntarily flocked to them as a human shield, was averted only by the direct intervention of President Jacques Chirac of France."

"...Was this a just war? - not by traditional Western standards of morality, as analyzed by Colonel Alex A. Vardamis (retired), former director of European Studies at the Army War College, in the Orange County Register on May 23, 1999."

"...First, there must be a just cause. In this case, the humanitarian disaster that ensued was previously merely potential. NATO aggression has created the larger part of it....

"...Second, war must have just intend. But, it is immoral to go to was to preserve the credibility of NATO, to extend the power of the NATO alliance for purposes not stated in its charter, to ensure that the Clinton administration makes its point felt, or to augment the hegemony of American or Central European power in some New World Order (NWO)"

"...Third, going to war must be a last resort. This clearly did not happened... The Rambouillet proposal was framed as an ultimatum - which it was known, could not be accepted by the Serbs - and no attempt was made to include neutral arbitration.

"Indeed, beyond international leadership, the Serbian Orthodox bishop of Kosovo, Artemije, was allowed no voice at Rambouillet. He had to hold his press conference outside the conference hall - in the snow. But his proposal for peace had been warmly received in Washington by a number of members of Congress, just a few weeks before the bombing began. He had made five visits to Washington on his Mission of Peace, including appeals for humanitarian aid for Serbs and Albanians alike. Such architects of peace, including Pavle, the patriarch of the

*Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade, were excluded from the proceedings.”*

“...Fourth, the decision to go to war must be made only by a legitimate authority. The Clinton administration has circumvented Congress, treaty obligations, and the United Nations. The action by NATO has been unilateral”

“...Fifth, a just war requires a reasonable prospect of success. High-altitude bombing, which devastates infrastructure, civilians, and nonmilitary targets, has not, and cannot, promote a just settlement of differences in Kosovo. The facts are these: NATO bombing has caused the greater part of the worst humanitarian catastrophe in Europe since World War II. Probably more Albanians have been killed by NATO bombs than by Serb forces, paramilitary groups, intra-ethnic enmity, or renegades.”

*“Under no terms of international law, the United Nations charter, or the Constitution of the United States can this be called a just war.”*

“The facts are these: NATO bombing has caused the greater part of worst humanitarian catastrophe in Europe since World War II. Probably more Albanians have been killed by NATO bombs than by Serb forces, paramilitary groups, intra-ethnic enmity, or renegades. Congressman Randy Duke Cunningham spoke of this on the floor of the House of Representatives, according to the Congressional Record on June 10, 1999, the day the agreement was announced. Under no terms of international law, the United Nations charter, or the Constitution of the United States can this be called a just war.”

“...What has this foreign policy produced? The answer is that dictatorship in Serbia has been strengthened, not displaced (as it happened after seven years of bombing in Iraq). Russia has been marginalized. China is being estranged. An unprecedented post-World War II humanitarian disaster in Europe has been created. Yugoslavia as a modern, civilized country has been physically destroyed. The Balkan lands and waters have been poisoned for years to come. The U.S. military has been depleted. Our credibility and prestige have been eroded. Serbs as a people have been put beyond compassion - they are now, immorally, being blamed as a nation and bombed on grounds that as a people they deserve it and are not to be pitied. This is like beating up an innocent family because one of its members is a wrongdoer.

*The premise is that of collective guilt. And a new principle of diplomacy has been dictated by the finger-waving Madelene Albright: “Do what we say or we’ll bomb you.”*

“...The foregoing leads to the hypocrisy of implied moral superiority, This is the ultimate arrogance. In his essay on the alleged lack of Serb guilt nationally, Richard Boudreaux said that Serbs have yet to accept responsibility - individually or collectively - for Kosovo’s bloody spring. He equates the present situation of Serbs with the agonizing soul-searching process of denazifica-

tion of Germany after World War II according to the *Los Angeles Times* on June 2, 1999.

Moral arrogance such as that which Boudreaux exemplifies resurrects the Nazi doctrine of the superior race. But who and what gives the U.S. administration the right to say how others should live or that a culture is unacceptable if it does not duplicate Western tastes? And this is at a time when internationally, United States popularity is at its lowest in a lifetime because of fear over United States aggressiveness. It is time for the U.S. administration to respect the thousand-year-old Serbian culture. Why is the Administration prejudiced against Eastern Christendom?”

“...I write as a Christian theologian - a Southern Baptist theological professor - deeply ashamed of the silence of my own denomination, and of the silence of the American evangelical community as a whole. I wish American Christians could read some of the peace-loving, suffering humanity-loving homilies of Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church, a true man of God, which I read during the summer of 1998 in Belgrade. Patriarch Pavle has publicly rebuked Serbs who commit atrocities, has called for Milosevic’s resignation, and is making an extended stay in Kosovo at Pec to rally Serb to remain, calling Where are the leaders of my own denomination on these moral issues? Why are the voices of Southern Baptist leaders in Arkansas so silent? What does “collateral damage” signify for them?”

*“The Clinton administration policy in regard to Kosovo was immoral at its root and was all the more perfidious because it was floated on grounds of humanitarian concern for the refugees - who have become refugees chiefly because of the administration’s misguided, war-mongering policies.”*

“None of the objectives of the war against Yugoslavia succeeded as a *sine qua non* result of the bombing campaign: to stop the interethnic slaughter, to prevent ethnic cleansing, to ensure the return of all or most of the refugees, to remove Milosevic from power (implied, but not explicitly stated), and to make NATO relevant for the 21st century.

“...The future of Serb nationality is in the hand of the loving Creator. he will judge the evils on every side and by every man, and will vindicate the faith of the faithful. I am reminded of the comment of Waldemar Januszchak, a Pole with more heart and humanity than Zbigniew Brzezinski, who marveled at the 700-year-old-Byzantine art in the Decani Monastery in Kosovo, which is living proof of Serb ownership of their sacred land: “It is fair to say, I suppose that Byzantine art is tough to admire. It talks down to you like a sentencing judge, There’s an intrinsic sternness to it” according to the London Sunday Times on May 16, 1999.” “Here is the core of ancient Serb Christian culture: the God of grace is also our judge, and finally will indeed judge men righteously for their deeds, Serb or American, Muslim or Jew, Orthodox or Roman Catholic or Protestant. An there’s no possible spinning of the truth.”

## BACK TO THE BALKAN DRAWING BOARD

FINANCIAL TIMES, MARCH 17, 2000

### COMMENT & ANALYSIS

By KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON

The author is a Republican Senator for Texas

Nato officials have been quick to call their Kosovo mission a success. But as the first anniversary of Operation Allied Force approaches, the upbeat tone belies reality.

Sadly, Nato's policy in Kosovo has come full circle. Kfor, the Kosovo peacekeeping force, was recently forced to deploy tear gas against the very Albanians on whose behalf Nato went to war. Last year, Nato took action to stop ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbs. Yet, since the end of the war, Nato has witnessed ethnic cleansing of Serbs by Albanians, with a severity approaching that of those that motivated foreign intervention in the first place.

Nato must get off of this bizarre merry-go-round. Doing so will require even greater fortitude than it took to go to war. It must acknowledge that imposing multi-cultural democracy at the point of a gun is not working. Instead, Nato members should bring the interested parties together and help them redraw the borders in the region. That would be the only way to ensure long-term stability.

Such a policy would recognise that there is a limit to the number of forces that can be maintained in this region. The Texas National Guard 49th Armoured Division will soon be deployed for eight months in the Balkans. This is a historic move: for the first time, US National Guard units will serve in command of active duty forces in Bosnia. I am proud of these Texans, but am wary of Nato's increasingly stretched capacities. It is hardly encouraging that it has become necessary to send part-time soldiers on full-time assignments.

Nato's Kosovo policy is based on its "success" in Bosnia, where thousands of Americans and other peacekeepers remain deployed, with no end in sight. The international community created a republic that ignores history, ethnicity, and nationality. During the last elections, refugees were bussed into disputed regions to vote for their candidates. But many of the newly elected officials have been unable to take office because they cannot return to their prewar homes. The region is likely to remain under Nato occupation for years, at the cost of billions of dollars.

Nato is taking the same, failed, approach towards Kosovo, where Kfor troops have begun to dig in for the long-haul. The US army's Camp Bondsteel headquarters have become the larg-

est US military construction project overseas since Vietnam, with more than 200 buildings. At a time when the US closes domestic military bases, it is fair to wonder why it is setting up such a long-term presence in Kosovo. The US must ensure the troops are secure and comfortable, but I question the permanence this effort suggests.

Long-term western occupation is a poor foundation on which to build a lasting peace in the Balkans. The long-term solution to the current crisis must encompass the entire region. So far, it has been impossible to solve the increasingly complex Balkan puzzle.

Redrawing the border lines, with consent of the governed, would create the conditions needed for stability, reconstruction, and prosperity. Nato should help establish Albanian, Serbian, Croatian, and secular Muslim states. Freedom of movement between these states should be guaranteed by international treaty. To be sure, there would be regions where clean divisions are hard to make. In these areas, international peacekeepers would have to guarantee safe passage.

However, such peacekeeping missions could be easily defined and would be relatively safe. They would resemble the kind of low-risk, limited-force, peacekeeping mission in which the US has participated for years and which the American people would support.

In fact, 90 per cent of Bosnia is now divided along ethnic lines and a permanent peace throughout the region can only be based on accepting this reality. Some have claimed that this would reward aggression, vindicating those who perpetrated "ethnic cleansing". Nato set out to undo the "wrong", trying to force multi-ethnic democracy on unwilling neighbours. This attempt has largely failed.

Moreover, Nato's military campaign was to deter other, potential aggressors from maltreating minorities, but Nato's actions in Bosnia and Kosovo did not stop the Indonesian military from brutalising the East Timorese. Nor did it prevent the civil war in Congo. In fact, it may have encouraged the Russians to take brutal action in Chechnya. Others have said partition would create countries which are too small to sustain themselves. Yet there have always been small countries which emerged from a single nationality, or religion, and which have thrived over time.

Regional conflicts have their own internal dynamic - one that lies ultimately beyond the influence of outside powers. An open-ended troop commitment in the Balkans is no substitute for self-determination and for creating the conditions that will lead to genuine stability in the region - one that reflects the apparent desires of the people who live there.

## GROUND TROOPS URGED FOR YUGOSLAVIA

By Naomi Koppel

Associated Press Writer

Wednesday, March 29, 2000; 10:03 a.m. EST

GENEVA << NATO should admit that its bombing of Yugoslavia failed and send in ground forces to battle extremist Albanians and restore the ethnic balance in Kosovo, a U.N. expert said Wednesday.

"The bombing hasn't solved any problems. It only multiplied the existing problems and created new ones," Jiri Dienstbier said after presenting his report to the 53-nation U.N. Commission on Human Rights.

Dienstbier, a former foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, listed the results of NATO's 78-day air campaign to stop Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's repression of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians.

"The Yugoslav economy was destroyed. Kosovo is destroyed. There are hundreds of thousands of people unemployed now," he said. "There is a very general pessimism."

Peacekeepers in the province have only one option now to be prepared to fight on the ground against extremist Kosovo Albanians so that the ethnic balance with Serbs and others in the province can be restored, he said.

The Kosovo Liberation Army has officially been disbanded, Dienstbier said. But its former leaders continue to wield great influence in the province, which is now run by NATO-led peacekeepers and the United Nations.

He said he found United States officials in the region generally share his pessimistic view.


"Only some of them explain to me that this is the year of the presidential elections and it is very difficult to change politics after years of a certain policy," Dienstbier said.

Many other countries have the same problem "because politicians who are responsible for what happened there are very careful before they make changes in the policy," he added.

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## SUGGESTED READING

From former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia James Bissett.  
<http://www.deltax.net/bissett/reading.htm>




*Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*

by Susan L. Woodward  
Brookings Institute ; ISBN: 0815795130

In my opinion the best book published so far on the reasons for the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation. The author attributes the collapse of the Federation to the breakdown of central authority and the deterioration of civil and government order - not ethnic hatred. Domestic economic and financial problems, which

began in the 80's, combined with a changing external environment and Western diplomatic intervention, exacerbated and contributed to the breakdown.


An important book and a brilliant analysis of how the challenges of the post-cold war era were misunderstood and mismanaged by the Western powers. Her book confirms everything I personally witnessed during my time in Yugoslavia



*The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*

by Misha Glenny  
Penguin ; ISBN: 0140257713

In this penetrating book--now with a new chapter covering events through 1995, including U.S. involvement--Misha Glenny offers a sobering eyewitness chronicle of the countdown to war, exploring the human realities behind the headlines, and puts one of the most ferocious civil wars of our time into its true, historical context.




*Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia*

by Rebecca West  
Penguin ; ISBN: 0140188479

This book describes the author's travels to Yugoslavia with her husband in 1937--a journey overshadowed by the growing inevitability of the Second World War. The book is colored by that impending conflict, and by West's search for universals amid the complex particulars of Balkan history. In the end, she saw the region's doom--and our own--in a double infatuation with sacrifice, the "black lamb and grey falcon" of her title.

BOOKS ON KOSOVO


Recently published by *The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies* (2400 Whiskey Rd #175, Aiken, SC 29803):



“*THE KOSOVO DOSSIER: Anatomy of a Crime*” (158 pages, ISBN: 1-892478-03-X, The Lord Byron Foundation, 1999). The book includes essays by prominent journalists, historians, and political scientists from both sides of the Atlantic. The book covers the past - a concise and reliable historical summary, the present - a comprehensive record of political, diplomatic, military, and media games without precedent in modern times, and the future - what are the prospects for Serbia,

for NATO, and for the U.S. relations with the rest of the world. Appendix contains the entire text of the final Rambouillet “peace plan.” \$10 and \$2 p.&p.

“KOSOVO UNDER NATO” – a collection of essays. The Lord Byron Foundation, 2000).




“*Kosovo*” by William Dorich (Edited by Basil W.R. Jenkins, 180 pages, ISBN: 1-882383-00-1, The Kosovo Charity Fund, 1992). Another valuable historical study of the Kosovo and Metohija history. Contains hundreds of beautiful color photos of Kosovo churches, icons and frescos. The full text and how to order the book can be found on [http://www.kosovo.com/history/dorich\\_kosovo/default.htm](http://www.kosovo.com/history/dorich_kosovo/default.htm)



“*NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War*” by Ted Galen Carpenter (152 pages - paper, ISBN 1-882577-86-8, The Cato Institute, 2000) The result of NATO's bombing offensive can scarcely be termed a victory. Viewed in a broader context, the war verged on being a policy fiasco. As the contributors to this volume show, the alliance's "victory" against Yugoslavia came at enormous cost. The war killed many innocent civilians —Serbs and Albanian Kosovars alike. It

exacerbated economic, social, and political tensions throughout the Balkans, making new rounds of ethnic conflict and other manifestations of instability more likely. NATO's decision to bypass the United Nations Security Council, and President Clinton's arrogant disregard of the congressional war power, undermined respect for the rule of law. (<http://www.cato.org/>)



Information about the book “*Crucified Kosovo*”, which was edited by the Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren, and which includes description of destroyed and desecrated Serbian Orthodox churches in Kosovo and Metohia (June-August, 1999), can be found on [http://spc.org.yu/Dogadjaji/Kosovo/raspeto\\_e.html](http://spc.org.yu/Dogadjaji/Kosovo/raspeto_e.html)




“*War of Words: Washington Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict*” By Danielle S. Sremac (296 pages -Hard Cover, ISBN: 0-275-96609-7, Westport, Conn.,1999)

During Yugoslav ethnic conflicts that caught global attention in the 1990s, why did Washington target only the Serbs? What led the U.S. to bomb a sovereign country-Yugoslavia? Was America's first intervention in an ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War era successful? In answering these and other questions, Sremac goes behind the rhetoric and propaganda to reveal how Yugoslavia's Bosnian Muslim, Croat, and Albanian ethnic factions sought to win the heart of Washington and draw U.S. military intervention to help them battle their adversaries-the Serbs. (<http://www.balkanaffairs.org/>) The book can also be ordered through <http://www.amazon.com/>



“*Kosovo Crisis: A Study in Foreign Policy Mismanagement*” By Vojin Joksimovich, (460 pages - Soft Cover, ISBN: 1-882383-10-9, Management Press,1999)

For those wanting a second opinion, or in the case of Kosovo, any opinion other than Madeleine Albright's and her compliant media spin doctors, *Kosovo Crisis: A Study in Foreign Policy Mismanagement* by Dr. Vojin Joksimovich is a first. It's the first book authored by this nuclear scientist, the first comprehensive detailed volume about the war in Kosovo as told from a non-NATO perspective. It's also the first "no-holds barred" attack on the NATO propaganda machine and their dirty little illegal war. (<http://www.suc.org/culture/library/Vojin/index.html>)



“*The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo*” By Noam Chomsky (Hard Cover, ISBN: 1567511767, Common Courage Pr., September 1999)

Noam Chomsky's book *The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo*, ably demonstrates how far we've come and, inadvertently, suggests how far there is to go. Chomsky contends that

almost everything you have read or heard or seen on television about Kosovo has been a partial truth or outright falsehood. For a general readership such an assertion would seem like fiction, as if Animal Farm were actually our controlled society. And Chomsky goes further, asserting that after NATO's war for Kosovo the malicious use of American power has become, more than ever before, the dominant fact of international politics. The book can be ordered through <http://www.amazon.com/>



*"Art of Kosovo: The Sacred Land"* by Gojko Subotic (Hardcover, 253 pages, ISBN: 1580930069, The Mancelli Press, 1999)

The Balkan region of Kosovo was in the Middle Ages a center of exceptional artistic activity. Closely bound to the sea and to European trading routes, this territory was deeply influenced by Byzantine lands to the east, resulting in a reach fusion of Eastern and Western styles. Today more than 1,300 Serbian medieval monuments remain: this volume represents the first time they are published for a Western audience. The book can be ordered through <http://www.amazon.com/>



*"NATO in the Balkans: Voices of Opposition,"* (220 pages, ISBN 0-9656916-2-4, IAC, 1998)

The cold war is over. But in the Balkans, the Pentagon has mounted its biggest military operation in Europe since the World War II. Most people are wondering why. The struggle in the Balkans is often confusing. Why, after decades of living together in a federation, are the nationalities at war with each other? This book will open your

eyes. It will help you understand what is happening in the Balkans. To order, send e-mail to [npcsf@igc.org](mailto:npcsf@igc.org).



*"Yugoslavia; An Avoidable War"* by Nora Beloff (ISBN 1-872410-08-1. 148 pp, royal paperback, New European Publications, 1997)

The book is certainly one of the most radical analyses on the subject of the breakup of Yugoslavia; in time, it may prove to be one of the most important. "In the West, the generally accepted thesis is that Yugoslavia collapsed from within. The alternative view is the converse. Events in Yugoslavia can only be understood within the international perspective: had it not been for the ignorance, arrogance and intrusion of the outside world, the conflicts in Yugoslavia could have been averted and, in some form, a state of Yugoslavia preserved." - Sir Richard Body MP

The book can be ordered through <http://www.amazon.co.uk>

## VIDEO-DOCUMENTARY :

"Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War" "Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War" is an award-winning two and one half hour video documentary which examines US and western intervention in the Balkans. While presenting themselves as peacemakers, Western countries helped initiate the break up of Yugoslavia, by providing illegal arms and intelligence support to different ethnic factions. The documentary produced by George Bogdanich and Martin Lettmayer for Frontier Theatre and Film Inc. traces the diplomatic and military blunders by the west which helped inflame ethnic tensions into a full blown civil war, using original footage and revealing interviews with well placed diplomats and military experts.

Most compelling are the candid statements of the decision-makers themselves, including former EC Mediator Lord Peter Carrington, former US Secretaries of State James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburger, as well as Germany's former foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher. "US intelligence agencies were unanimous in saying that if we recognize Bosnia it will blow up," says former State Department official George Kenney. Yet, according to former acting US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, domestic political considerations -- the 1992 election campaign between Bill Clinton and George Bush - led to the tragic decision to recognize Bosnia without a political settlement among the Muslims Serbs and Croats. The film makes a powerful argument that the US drew the wrong lesson from the Bosnian conflict leading to its decision to intervene in the civil war that simmered in Kosovo.

The manipulation of news coverage by the warring sides is explored in compelling footage and in interviews with veteran journalists such as David Binder of the New York Times and John MacArthur, columnist and publisher of Harper's Magazine, as well as scholars Susan Woodward and Ted Galen Carpenter. The documentary offers powerful evidence of US involvement in "Operation Storm," the Croatian army's violent expulsion of its ethnic Serbian minority in 1995, an action which had an eerie parallel with the expulsion of Albanian refugees in Kosovo by Serbian forces following NATO intervention on the side of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Compelling candid interviews from military officers including UN Commanders Sir Michael Rose, Lewis MacKenzie and former Pentagon Chief of Staff General Colin Powell elucidate how Western policymakers blundered by taking sides and by relying on military means to settle political problems.

TO ORDER A COPY OF THE FILM, please send a check for \$49.95 per copy to Frontier Theatre and Film Inc. P.O. Box 869 New York, NY 10021 (Overseas orders add \$5 for additional shipping and handling). Be sure to include an address where videotape copies of "Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War" can be sent.